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***JOINT FORCES STAFF COLLEGE***

**JOINT ADVANCED WARFIGHTING  
SCHOOL**

**SEEKING THE PERFECT EDGE:  
JOINT ENHANCEMENT OF SERVICE TITLE X RESPONSIBILITIES**

by

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*A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Joint Advanced Warfighting School in partial satisfaction of the requirements of a Master of Science Degree in Joint Campaign Planning and Strategy. The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Joint Forces Staff College or the Department of Defense.*

*This paper is entirely my own work except as documented in footnotes.*

Signature: \_\_\_\_\_

**16 June 2010**

**Thesis Adviser: James F. Dickens, Colonel USA**



**Title: “SEEKING THE PERFECT EDGE: JOINT ENHANCMENT OF SERVICE  
TITLE X RESPONSIBILITIES”**

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**ABSTRACT**

Demonstrations of U. S. military innovation and adaptation permeate recent and ongoing joint operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan. These characteristics are critical where U.S. military forces are poised against a complex, distributed, often elusive enemy. As the current war continues, enemy forces will persistently respond unexpectedly to our actions. Conflict will evolve in unforeseen and unpredictable directions. Anticipating this, long-term U.S. success lies in refining, recalibrating, and enhancing the effectiveness of the joint force. This enhancement must include the institutionalization of a joint culture. The incorporation of joint adaptation and innovation into Title X responsibilities of all services will facilitate tomorrow’s victories as a rule vice an exception.

Among the services – the Marine Corps has an enviable reputation for innovation and adaptation, maintaining very high standards of excellence in the art of warfare. The service has a proven method of developing exceptional individuals and units through a blend of training, experience, and education. Historically this preparation has focused on service-specific requirements, failing to provide an enhanced joint exposure. Future operational environments will place a premium on agile, rapidly deployable expeditionary forces. Our nation’s global interests, the international community’s desire for stability and the breadth of possible missions demand a discriminating, multi-capable joint force. Combating evolving foes in both current and emerging operational environments requires a highly trained and educated joint acculturated force.

Enhancing current Marine Corps education, training, and doctrine will increase the capability of future joint forces with Marines as a key component. Through modest refinements in Title X responsibilities, all services will produce individuals, staffs and units more capable of seamless integration within the joint and coalition environment of the future.

**Key Words:** Marine Corps, JPME, Joint Training, Joint Context, Joint Culture

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## **INTRODUCTION**

Demonstrations of U. S. military innovation and adaptation permeate recent and ongoing joint operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan. These characteristics are critical where U.S. military forces remain poised against a complex, distributed, often elusive enemy. As the current war continues, enemy forces will persistently respond unexpectedly to our actions. Conflict will evolve in unforeseen and unpredictable directions. Anticipating this condition, long-term U.S. success lies in refining, recalibrating, and enhancing the effectiveness of the joint force. This enhancement must include the institutionalization of a joint culture. The incorporation of joint adaptation and innovation into Title X responsibilities of all services will facilitate tomorrow's victories as a rule vice an exception. These enhancements, focused on service education, training, and doctrine, will increase the capability of future joint forces to defeat the evolving enemy of the future. This paper utilizes the Marine Corps as an example and focuses on its required modifications.

In July of 2008, the U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff ordered the deployment of a Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) to southern Afghanistan in support of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). Marine Forces Command (MARFORCOM)



identified and sourced all components of the force. By the first week of November, Special Purpose MAGTF – Afghanistan (SPMAGTF-A) converged on Afghanistan.<sup>1</sup>

SPMAGTF-A's assigned mission was to “conduct full spectrum counterinsurgency operations with a focus on police mentoring and training” in their assigned area of operations.<sup>2</sup> The MAGTF consisted of units and capabilities from around the world. The 3d Marine Division from Okinawa Japan comprised the Command Element (CE). The 3d Battalion, 8<sup>th</sup> Marines from Camp Lejeune North Carolina comprised the Ground Combat Element (GCE). The Aviation Combat Element (ACE) consisted of individuals and units from disparate locations and commands. The headquarters element originated in Cherry Point, North Carolina. Initial attack helicopter units redeployed from Al Asad, Iraq to Afghanistan. Eventually a second group of attack and utility helicopter units, sourced from Camp Pendleton, California, replaced them. Heavy lift helicopters originated from Kaneohe Bay, Hawaii. Refueler/transporter aircraft arrived from Miramar, California. The aviation support element originated in Yuma, Arizona. Combat Logistics Battalion 3 (CLB-3) from Okinawa Japan comprised the Logistics Combat Element (LCE).<sup>3</sup> The final organization proved highly diverse, given the global sourcing of the units described above.

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<sup>1</sup> Christopher Sonntag, *Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) Report, Special Purpose MAGTF – Afghanistan Operations*, August 19, 2009, 8.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., 8.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid., 6.

This diversity generated internal friction. SPMAGTF-A individuals and units met for the first time under combat conditions. All of the units lacked operational experience as units in Afghanistan. Intensifying this challenge, the force was undermanned, constrained to 1800 personnel. This situation was in contrast to the mission analysis, which indicated a requirement for nearly 2500.<sup>4</sup> The complex set of joint and coalition command relationships further intensified the existing friction within SPMAGTF-A. SPMAGTF-A functioned under the operational control (OPCON) of Marine Forces Central Command (MARCENT) while assigned under the tactical control (TACON) of NATO and further sub-assigned under a regional command of NATO's International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Because a portion of their assigned mission related to training and mentoring police forces, the MAGTF also maintained a relationship with Combined Security Transition Command Afghanistan (CSTC-A).<sup>5</sup> Overcoming these challenges demanded flexibility, adaptability and compliance with unfamiliar doctrine and standard operating procedures.

While SPMAGTF-A proved highly adaptive in the end, initial challenges generated a noticeable delay in attainment of full operational capability. In late November 2008, in the Farah Province city of Shewan, approximately 250 insurgents ambushed a 30-man force from the GCE of SPMAGTF-A. Friendly vehicles came under a barrage of enemy rocket propelled grenades (RPGs) and machine gun fire. This attack

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<sup>4</sup> Colonel Duffy White, USMC, Commanding Officer, SPMAGTF-A, Interview with Colonel Mark Silvia, Deputy Director, Operations, MCCLL, May 28, 2009, 4-5.

<sup>5</sup> Sonntag, *MCCLL Report*, 13.

resulted in the destruction of friendly vehicles and sparked an intense eight-hour battle between the Marines and enemy forces. With a portion of their force trapped in the ambush kill zone, the Marines fought to recover their comrades while simultaneously attacking enemy fortified positions to clear the ambush site. During the battle, an individual Marine sharpshooter reportedly killed 20 enemy fighters with accurate rifle fire. Although the unit called for close-air support soon after initial contact, friendly aviation or indirect fires were never in position to support the eight-hour battle.<sup>6</sup>

Marines from SPMAGTF-A eventually prevailed in this encounter, but they did so without timely support from available external joint assets, specifically aviation. The Marines of SPMAGTF-A had similar engagements during the first 30 days of the deployment where they experienced unanticipated delays in support from aviation delivered fires. Learning and incorporating the nuanced skills of operating in this complex joint and combined environment required time as the approval of both preplanned and immediate requests for close air support (CAS) transcended multiple layers of authorization.<sup>7</sup> These requirements often produced delays in the approval of aviation support to troops in contact (TIC), if they were approved at all.<sup>8</sup> According to LtCol Mike Watkins, the commander of the SPMAGTF-A ACE, close air support in the

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<sup>6</sup> James Mercure, "Marines' Heroic Actions at Shewan Leave More Than 50 Insurgents Dead, Several Wounded," November 21, 2008, <http://waronterrornews.typepad.com/home/2008/11/marines-heroic-actions-at-shewan-.html> (accessed March 4, 2010).

<sup>7</sup> Rules of engagement, command relationships and a lack of personnel depth and equipment at various levels of command combined to complicate the targeting process. Collateral damage estimation and coordinate mensuration could only be conducted at higher headquarters. Sonntag, *MCCLL Report*, 13.

<sup>8</sup> Lara M. Dadkhah, "Close Air Support and Civilian Casualties in Afghanistan," *Small Wars Journal* 12 December 2008, 6.

joint and coalition environment was less effective early in the deployment as the forward air controllers had to adapt during execution. He summarized this issue in an interview:

*NATO fixed wing are under different ROE (Rules of Engagement) caveats, so what you would expect from a USMC CAS platform you don't necessarily get from say like a French or a Dutch platform. FACs (Forward Air Controller[s]) are all pretty savvy on being able to make adjustments... [but] ...the level of integration just isn't quite there.*<sup>9</sup>

Because the controllers were learning the capabilities, limitations, and request procedures for non-organic assets during combat, developing methods for effective utilization of these assets took time. The ground combat element shared this view in their after action reports. According to LtCol David Odom, the commander of the SPMAGTF-A GCE, learning how to employ close air support assets effectively took time. “All the NATO air that supported me, it went back to caveats; if you knew the caveats, you knew how to employ it, just like any other weapons system, you knew strengths and weaknesses.”<sup>10</sup> Learning these caveats required time and experience.

Joint aviation assets were not the only enablers that the MAGTF had to learn to use effectively. In the opening stages of combat operations, there were also challenges in making efficient use of unmanned aerial systems. In December of 2008, the 1<sup>st</sup> Platoon of CLB-3's Motor Transportation Company came under fire during a combat logistics patrol across Helmand Province. While enroute to Forward Operating Base (FOB) Musa Qala

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<sup>9</sup> Lieutenant Colonel Mike Watkins, USMC, Commanding Officer, SPMAGTF-Afghanistan ACE, Interview with Colonel Silvia, MCCLL Deputy Director of Operations, May 6, 2009, 17-18.

<sup>10</sup> Lieutenant Colonel David Odom, USMC, Commanding Officer, 3d Bn, 8th Marines, Interview by Colonel Mark Silvia, MCCLL Deputy Director of Operations, May 28, 2009, 51.

with a load of British and American supplies, the platoon experienced several improvised explosive device (IED) strikes and coordinated insurgent attacks. “There were three things I said would happen during this convoy,” said Sergeant B. C. Chesterbristow, the dismounted sweep team non-commissioned officer in charge for 1<sup>st</sup> Platoon. He predicted finding IEDs, hitting IEDs and engaging enemy forces. His predictions became reality when the convoy struck two IEDs, uncovered four additional IEDs and received indirect and direct fire, all during the 54-hour operation.<sup>11</sup> Although attack helicopters, F/A-18 Hornets and B-1 Bombers all arrived on station to provide assistance to the patrol, only the helicopters were effective in enabling the platoon to break contact and eventually reach their planned destination. Even though the dangers along the route were known in advance to 1<sup>st</sup> Platoon’s convoy commander, the patrol did not utilize available joint unmanned aerial systems (UAS) to screen in advance of their movement. In the end, immediate action training,<sup>12</sup> adaptive thinking, and supporting arms prevented excessive casualties for the platoon.

Like the earlier engagement in Shewan, the Marines from CLB-3 prevailed. However, they might have avoided excessive threat exposure through more effective utilization of available joint assets. Effective intelligence is critical in successful COIN operations. “A combination of unmanned aircraft systems, manned aircraft, and space-

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<sup>11</sup> Ronald Stauffer, “Marine Logistics Patrol Pushes Through IEDs, Insurgent Attacks in Afghanistan,” 18 January 2009, [http://www.dvidshub.net/?script=news/news\\_show.php&id=28993](http://www.dvidshub.net/?script=news/news_show.php&id=28993) (accessed March 14, 2010).

<sup>12</sup> Military units conduct immediate action training to prepare for responses to likely threat scenarios. During this training, drills are repeated until each member of the unit understands his role relative to other members of the unit and is able to execute reactions out of habit and with minimal thought.

based platforms,” including Predator drones and Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar Systems (JSTARS) aircraft, provide required signals intelligence, aerial reconnaissance, and perform various information operations.<sup>13</sup> According to LtCol Odom, a lack of predeployment exposure to these capabilities resulted in their underutilization. He stated that he lacked exposure to many assets prior to arriving in theater and that he “didn’t really fully realize the potential of [them] until you got out here and you’re flying them.”<sup>14</sup> However, once the force understood capabilities and limitations of the systems, extensive use of these assets enhanced the effectiveness of SPMAGTF-A. According to LtCol Odom:

*At my level, having that Scan Eagle feed in my COC [Combat Operations Center], and even better, at some of my company’s COCs and a forward eye capability was huge. The force multiplier [was] when I had a Reaper or a Predator, when I had something with a payload, because achieving PID (Positive Identification) is really what you’re looking for.*<sup>15</sup>

Employment of enabling assets eventually proved a force multiplier, validating the enhanced effectiveness of a joint force. However, given that many enablers reside outside the table of organization of Marine units, their effective employment comes only from exposure and training. Unfortunately, in the case of SPMAGTF-A, this exposure and training took place in the heat of battle.

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<sup>13</sup> Department of the Army, *Counterinsurgency Field Manual No. 3-24/Marine Corps Warfighting Publication No. 3-33.5*, (Washington D.C.: Department of the Army, 2006), E-2.

<sup>14</sup> Odom, Interview by Colonel Mark Silvia, 51.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid., 52-53.

The Commanding Officer of SPMAGTF-A, Colonel D. White, stated in an interview conducted at the end of his tour in Afghanistan:

*We trained up our core headquarters, but a lot of the people joined us here in theater, as well, so not having a MAGTF training ability, and I think the exact same thing happened with 2nd MEB [Marine Expeditionary Brigade] coming in; where does the Marine Corps train MAGTFs anyway? We don't.*<sup>16</sup>

Had SPMAGTF-A individuals and units been exposed to an enhanced set of educational and training experiences, the force would have anticipated and avoided many pitfalls encountered during initial combat operations. According to the Marine Corps Tactics and Operations Group,<sup>17</sup> the Marine Corps is presently in a position “to consistently deploy Regimental Combat Team staffs to OEF with insufficient time to form the staff, train it in battle staff fundamentals and prepare for combat operations prior to deployment.”<sup>18</sup>

The Marine Corps has a reputation for innovation and adaptation, maintaining very high standards of excellence in the art of warfare. As evidenced by the success of SPMAGTF-A, the Marine Corps can meet the Congressional mandate of being “most ready when the nation is least ready.”<sup>19</sup> Marines have proven methods of developing

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<sup>16</sup> White, Interview by Colonel Mark Silvia, 28-29.

<sup>17</sup> The Mission of the Marine Corps Tactics & Operations Group is to provide advanced and standardized training in MAGTF operations, combined arms, and unit training management and readiness at the battalion and regimental levels and to synchronize doctrine and training standards for the ground combat element (GCE) in order to enhance combat preparation and performance of GCE units in MAGTF operations. It is also referred to as the USMC Ground Combat Element Center of Excellence.

<sup>18</sup> Director, Marine Corps Tactics and Operations Group, *MCTOG'S Submission To The TECOM Systemic Trends Report*, September 30, 2009, 7.

<sup>19</sup> U.S. Marine Corps, *Marine Corps Vision & Strategy 2025*, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2008), 23.

exceptional individuals and units through a blend of training, experience, and education. Nonetheless, this preparation has focused historically on service-specific requirements.

Future operational environments will place a premium on agile, rapidly deployable expeditionary forces, able “to react rapidly across the range of military operations and prevail, even thrive, in the uncertainty and chaos of emerging crises.”<sup>20</sup> Combating evolving foes in both current and emerging operational environments requires a highly trained and educated force. Enhancing Marine Corps education, training, and doctrine will increase the capability of future Marine forces to defeat evolving enemies. Through modest refinements in Title X responsibilities, the service will produce individuals, staffs and units more capable of seamless integration within the joint and coalition environment of the future.

### **Scope and Methodology**

Portions of this paper span the levels of warfare from tactical to strategic. However, the focus is on service shortfalls applicable to the fielding and employment of operational-level joint forces. This study highlights shortfalls in Marine Corps programs and processes. While small portions explore the potential for enhancement solutions, the primary focus of the paper is the identification of shortfalls and implications.

Despite focusing on shortfalls unique to the United States Marine Corps, similar deficiencies exist across all of the uniformed services. Issues specific to the Marine Corps

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<sup>20</sup> Ibid., 13.



will facilitate the analysis of other services. The ultimate goal is to aid in the future improvement of an already formidable joint force.

## CHAPTER I: EMBRACING JOINTNESS

Jointness is not a new concept. During World War II, U. S. leadership recognized the potential of joint action by land, sea, and air forces. Jointness rapidly became a precondition for success on the modern battlefield. Services developed expertise in joint operations through hard-earned experiences, often including operational failures and missteps rather than advanced formal preparation by education and training.<sup>1</sup>

A lack of officers trained in the conduct of joint and combined warfare prompted the establishment of dedicated joint educational programs. Initially the Joint Chiefs of Staff established the Army Navy Staff College (ANSCOL) in 1943.<sup>2</sup> By 1946, the Department of Defense (DoD) established two additional joint service schools, the Industrial College of the Armed Forces (ICAF) and the National War College (NWC). That same year ANSCOL became the Armed Forces Staff College (AFSC).<sup>3</sup> These schools prepared selected military officers and civilian officials for command, management, and staff responsibilities. Curriculum emphasized national security formulation, military strategy development, mobilization, management of resources for national security, and planning for joint and combined operations.<sup>4</sup> The focus of effort was the production of officers skilled in the planning and execution of joint and combined military operations.

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<sup>1</sup> Gregory C. Kennedy and Keith Neilson, *Military Education: Past, Present, and Future* (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 2002), 150.

<sup>2</sup> William E. Simons, *Professional Military Education in the United States: A Historical Dictionary* (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 2000), 11.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid., 13.

<sup>4</sup> U.S. Joint Forces Staff College, *The Joint Staff Officer's Guide 2000* (Norfolk, Virginia: National Defense University, 2000), 1-56.

Despite efforts taken under the National Security Act of 1947 to institutionalize jointness, the services turned inward, establishing independent systems of military education and training. They increased focus on service requirements, incrementally deemphasizing the jointness lessons of World War II. As Kennedy states in his treatise on military education, “cursory examination of the services’ performance in the Vietnam War, for instance, where the marines and the army each conducted autonomous and uncoordinated operations in separate regions ... shows how far jointness had regressed.”<sup>5</sup> Service cultures and biases shaped the outputs of service schools. This prevailed until the late 1980s when joint warfare transformed once again, under a new mandate.

On 14 November 1985, the Senate Armed Services Committee called for the testimony of Secretary of Defense Weinberger to examine the organization of his department.<sup>6</sup> An apparent lack of integrated planning and operations between the services dissatisfied Congress. Senators implicated service cultural loyalties as obstacles to joint warfighting competence. Mandating testimony and analysis, the 99<sup>th</sup> Congress explored options toward resolution of these obstacles.<sup>7</sup> At issue was a piece of legislation introduced by Senators Barry Goldwater and Sam Nunn to correct command and organizational issues within the Pentagon. A series of operational failures, specifically

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<sup>5</sup> Kennedy and Neilson. *Military Education*, 150.

<sup>6</sup> Kenneth C. Allard, *Command, Control, and the Common Defense* (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1990), 1.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, 2.

Operation Eagle Claw<sup>8</sup>, the 1983 Beirut Marine barracks bombing, and Operation Urgent Fury,<sup>9</sup> created a culminating point for joint disunity. Reviews of the lessons learned from these operations identified a “failure of the services to work together.”<sup>10</sup> Analyses indicated a lack of interoperable equipment, procedural commonality, and joint competency between services. Highlighting the root cause, Bernard E. Trainor wrote in his 1993 article on jointness that:

*Reformers charged that the services had exchanged officers and sent students to each other’s schools for years, but that it was not enough to transcend service culture. When it came to operations, land, sea, and air forces tended to operate autonomously, ignoring colleagues in differently colored uniforms.*<sup>11</sup>

In reaction to this predicament, Congress passed the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act (GNA), enhancing national warfighting capability through mandated jointness. The desired end state was an increased effectiveness for military forces executing national security policy and strategy.<sup>12</sup> The opening statement of the GNA describes the legislation as “an Act ... to provide for more efficient use of defense resources, to improve joint officer management policies, otherwise to enhance the effectiveness of military operations and improve the

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<sup>8</sup> A failed attempt in 1980 to rescue American hostages from Iranian revolutionaries sometimes referred to as Desert One.

<sup>9</sup> The U.S. led invasion of Grenada in 1983. Although ultimately successful, allegations were made that the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine forces experienced communication problems, challenging the coordinated efforts of the US forces.

<sup>10</sup> Bernard E. Trainor, “Jointness, Service Culture, and the Gulf War,” *Joint Force Quarterly*, Winter 1993-1994, 71.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid.

<sup>12</sup> Donald K. Minner, *Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986: Should the General Staff Debate Be Over?* (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air War College, 1997), 3.

management and administration of the DoD, and for other purposes.”<sup>13</sup> These lofty goals demanded shifts in service culture and a new breed of joint minded leaders.

GNA triggered the most significant reorganization of the U. S. military since the end of the Second World War. The two decades since its delivery reveal increased integration within the DoD. GNA spearheaded the development of joint doctrine, legislated improved coordination between the services, and established requirements to prepare military officers for joint duty. These developments established the foundation of a more capable joint force.

Contemporary military operations reveal the significant advantages to the employment of joint forces. These include complementary capabilities, increased flexibility, and the exploitation of enemy vulnerabilities through the asymmetric employment of friendly forces.<sup>14</sup> The attainment of these advantages requires effort from all services. Enhanced service education, training, equipment and doctrine are therefore essential to the acculturation of forces that can integrate effectively toward these ends.

Today, the United States faces an environment of accelerating political, economic, technological, social and military change. These changes manifest themselves in a progressively more dangerous global environment. International competition exists across the spectrum of conflict, creating conditions of crisis and disorder. The persistent

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<sup>13</sup> U.S. Congress, *Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986*, Public Law 99-433, October 1, 1986, 1.

<sup>14</sup> Milan N. Vego, *Joint Operational Warfare* (Newport, Rhode Island: Naval War College, 2007), V-99.

threat of terrorism, combined with famine, resource shortages and natural disasters add to this milieu. Now, military forces of the United States find themselves assigned to either augment or accomplish multidimensional missions in the context of this challenging environment.<sup>15</sup> Success demands unity of effort and command. History validates the employment of a fully integrated and interdependent joint team as an essential element of successful military operations. Despite this obvious condition, achieving unified action from individual military services presents serious challenges.

The evolution of military force employment continues today as the role of the military is under constant refinement. Historically, warfare focused on the application of one nation's military forces against another's. In contrast to this trend, many future adversaries will operate independent of nation-states. They will operate in loosely organized networks, mixing with local populations, blurring the distinctions between combatants and non-combatants. They will emerge at their own discretion, inflicting casualties in an attempt to encourage disproportionate reactions and excessive use of force. In this future environment, our adversaries will strive to meet us where we are not – both tactically and operationally.<sup>16</sup> Countering friendly desires to minimize collateral damage, adversary forces will attempt to expand it, exploiting it for propaganda purposes. While contemporary joint forces seek to create a safer environment, their adversaries will seek a more dangerous one. With future joint forces attempting to expand conditions of

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<sup>15</sup> U.S. Joint Forces Command, *The Joint Operating Environment (JOE): Challenges and Implications for the Future Joint Force*, (Ft. Belvoir, Virginia: Defense Technical Information Center, 2008), 42.

<sup>16</sup> Peter W Chiarelli, "Training Full Spectrum: Less Is More," *Army*, August 2009, 19.

peace and prosperity, their adversaries will create chaos, openly oppressing and dominating the extended battle space. Adversary tactics generate an increased demand for enhanced joint capabilities. Tomorrow's security challenges will place a premium on the ability of the joint force to accomplish a diverse array of tasks, simultaneously or in quick succession.

This complex future will challenge Marines at all levels to possess a shared understanding of mission and purpose and will further challenge the personal initiative required for effective joint operations. Successful execution on future battlefields will require openness, cooperation and interdependence among a host of partners within the joint force. It will also demand an enhanced education and training process, more interoperable equipment, and fully synchronized doctrine.

### **USMC Service Responsibilities**

U. S. law obligates the Marine Corps to prepare today for tomorrow's challenges as a member of the joint force.<sup>17</sup> Through the National Security Act of 1947, Congress assigned roles, missions, and functions to all agencies of DoD, and unified efforts within the Department.<sup>18</sup> The primary function established for the Marine Corps is to provide forces, organized, trained and equipped, to support a Combatant Commander in the

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<sup>17</sup> U.S. Marine Corps, *Marine Corps Vision & Strategy 2025*, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2008), 1.

<sup>18</sup> According to Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review Report* (Ft. Belvoir, Virginia: Defense Technical Information Center, 2009), page 4, "Roles are the broad and enduring purposes of the Services. Missions are the tasks assigned by the President or Secretary of Defense to combatant commanders. Functions are specific responsibilities assigned to the Services by the President and Secretary of Defense enabling the fulfillment of their roles."

accomplishment of specific missions.<sup>19</sup> Inherent in this function is the acculturation of Marines capable of successful integration with a joint force. The service shares this responsibility with other DoD stakeholders.

Under Title X, authorities and responsibilities overlap between the services and combatant commanders. Combatant commanders oversee all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics for forces assigned to them, while the services are responsible for organizing, equipping, and training those same forces. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) is the DoD lead for enhancing joint warfighting capabilities through joint education and training. As such, successful joint adaptation must be a collaborative effort between the services and the combatant commands, specifically JFCOM.

During 2009, JFCOM focused on a number of key areas in the execution of their mission: “To provide mission-ready, joint-capable forces and support the development and integration of joint, interagency and multinational capabilities to meet the present and future operational needs of the joint force.”<sup>20</sup> Joint education and training were two of those areas. In March of 2009, General James N. Mattis testified to the House Armed Services Committee, outlining recent JFCOM education and training initiatives. He stated that ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have “demonstrated that joint education

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<sup>19</sup> Colin L. Powell, *Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Report on the Roles, Missions, and Functions of the Armed Forces of the United States* (Washington, D.C.: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1993), I-3.

<sup>20</sup> U.S. Joint Forces Command, USJFCOM: Command Mission And Strategic Goals, <http://www.jfcom.mil/about/priorities.htm> accessed 22 Feb 2010.



must be incorporated at the tactical level among junior officers and our senior NCOs.”<sup>21</sup> Consistent with this, JFCOM distilled lessons learned from these “extended campaigns” and incorporated them into all levels of training and education. However, the current process demands “almost three years to bring lessons learned ... through the doctrinal process and curriculum certification period.”<sup>22</sup> Current JFCOM efforts seek methods to transform training, education, and doctrine creating more efficient and relevant programs. By leveraging these efforts, the Marine Corps can enhance current methods to meet the rigorous demands of today and the unknown future.

Formal joint instructions define education as a process that “conveys general bodies of knowledge and develops habits of mind applicable to a broad spectrum of endeavors.”<sup>23</sup> The individual warfighter is the primary object of education. In contrast, joint instructions define training as “instruction and applied exercises for acquiring and retaining skills, knowledge, and attitudes required to complete specific tasks.”<sup>24</sup> Both individuals and units can be the object of training. Education and training are not mutually exclusive. However, this analysis considers them separately, focusing the analysis of education on individual service members and the analysis of training on units, specifically the MAGTF.

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<sup>21</sup> U.S. Congress, House Armed Services Committee, *Statement of General James N. Mattis, USMC Commander United States Joint Forces Command*, March 18, 2009, 19.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, 20.

<sup>23</sup> Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Officer Professional Military Education Policy, CJCSI 1800.01C* (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2005), GL-5.

<sup>24</sup> Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Training Manual, CJCSM 3500.03B*, (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2007), GL-19.

## CHAPTER II: PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION

In his Vision and Strategy, the Commandant of the Marine Corps emphasizes that “the individual Marine will remain [the Corps’] most important warfighting asset.”<sup>1</sup> Fundamental to winning wars are the “enduring powers of the human spirit and intelligence, as opposed to ephemeral technologies and the weapon systems of the day.”<sup>2</sup> People and their preparation through education will ultimately serve as the keys to mission success. Given this, it is intuitive that Professional Military Education (PME) is a critical element of success. It is also the developmental foundation of those individuals who can contribute most effectively to the future joint force.

History demonstrates that an overreliance on technology and equipment can lead to failure. In October 1973, the simultaneous Syrian and Egyptian attacks on Israel at the beginning of the Yom Kippur War provide a clear example. Israeli intelligence, heavily reliant on technology, failed to predict the assault despite a relatively clear and accurate operational picture.<sup>3</sup> An opponent employing superior intellect achieved through education and training presents an even greater threat. As an example, from 1972 to 1973, Navy fighter pilots, trained at the “Topgun” Fighter Weapons School, achieved a 12-to-1 shoot down advantage over their North Vietnamese adversaries.<sup>4</sup> In a war

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<sup>1</sup> U.S. Marine Corps, *Marine Corps Vision & Strategy 2025*, 25.

<sup>2</sup> Charles E. Wilhelm, Wallace C. Gregson, Bruce B. Knutson, Paul K. Van Riper, Andrew F. Krepinevich, and Williamson Murray, *U.S. Marine Corps Officer Professional Military Education 2006 Study and Findings* (Quantico, Virginia: Marine Corps University, 2006), 41.

<sup>3</sup> Robert S. Bolia, “Overreliance on Technology in Warfare: The Yom Kippur War as a Case Study,” *Parameters*, Summer 2004, 55.

<sup>4</sup> Barry D. Watts, *US Combat Training, Operational Art, and Strategic Competence: Problems and Opportunities* (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2008), 11.

between two strong opponents, victory will go to the side that thinks better and acts faster and with greater determination.<sup>5</sup> This does not deny the importance of advanced weaponry. However, superior thinking is far more critical than advanced technology.

### **Joint Professional Military Education Requirements**

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) describes the objective of joint education in the Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP) by stating, “Joint education prepares leaders to both conduct operations as a coherently joint force and to think their way through uncertainty.”<sup>6</sup> The OPMEP describes three main components of the environment best suited to accomplishing these goals: student composition, faculty, and learning methodology.<sup>7</sup> These comprise a ‘joint context.’ Identifying joint context shortfalls requires an examination of these components.

The CJCS promulgates joint education requirements through two main instructions. For officers, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 1800.01 “Officer Professional Military Education Policy” or OPMEP contains applicable guidance. For enlisted personnel, CJCSI 1805.01, “Enlisted PME Policy” or EPMEP contains applicable guidance. These documents contain policies, procedures, objectives, and responsibilities for both service and joint professional military education. There are no CJCS or DoD directives dedicated to the implementation civilian PME. Ultimately,

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<sup>5</sup> Vego, *Joint Operational Warfare*, I-11.

<sup>6</sup> CJCS, *Officer Professional Military Education Policy*, A-A-2.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid., B1 thru B3.

compliance with existing requirements prepares individuals to function more effectively in joint, interagency, and multinational operations and organizations.

**Officer PME Policy (OPMEP)**

The CJCS vision contained in the OPMEP provides an effective summary of both basic and joint requirements for officers. The Chairman states that “PME needs to continue to build an officer that understands the strategic implications of tactical actions ... service delivery of PME, taught in a joint context, instills basic Service core competencies; JPME enhances joint warfighting and leader competence.”<sup>8</sup> The OPMEP mandates the policies and procedures required to implement an effective PME and JPME process consistent with this vision. It outlines threshold curriculum, academic evaluation, instructional climate, student body, faculty, and resource specifications reflecting a dynamic system of officer career education. Through the identification of emphasis areas, the OPMEP provides joint curriculum guidance for PME institutions.<sup>9</sup> The officer PME continuum contained in the OPMEP is a comprehensive depiction of PME and JPME, guiding an officer’s individual development over time (see Appendix A for a detailed depiction of the officer PME continuum). This continuum is progressive and designed to develop joint knowledge, skills, perspectives, and values essential for officers. The Joint Staff validates officer PME and JPME programs through the Process for Accreditation of Joint Education (PAJE), valid for a 6-year timeframe.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> Ibid., 2.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid., B-1 thru B-3.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid., F-B-3.

### **Enlisted PME Policy (EPMEP)**

No law mandates enlisted JPME. However, the CJCS realizes that an expansion of joint competency to all levels of war indicates a requirement to expand JPME to enlisted personnel.<sup>11</sup> The EPMEP establishes joint learning objectives and procedures for the incorporation of joint focus areas into existing service curriculums. It also establishes methodology and techniques for CJCS oversight of service programs. The guidance consists of joint focus areas, joint learning areas (JLA), and joint learning objectives (JLO); all linked to the five EPME levels (see Appendix B for a detailed depiction of the enlisted PME continuum). This continuum is progressive and designed to develop joint knowledge, skills, perspectives, and values essential for enlisted personnel. There is no process for formal CJCS accreditation of EJPME programs. Compliance methodology consists of service self-assessments forwarded to the Joint Staff.<sup>12</sup>

### **Marine Corps Professional Military Education Requirements**

The Commandant of the Marine Corps, in compliance with CJCS instructions, establishes service PME programs, promulgating them through Marine Corps Order (MCO) 1553.4B. This order outlines the intent of the Commandant, explaining in detail that participation in all aspects of the PME program is an “institutional expectation” for all Marines.<sup>13</sup> The order contains both officer and enlisted requirements. Synchronized

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<sup>11</sup> Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Enlisted Professional Military Education Policy, CJCSI 1805.01* (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2005), 1.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, C-3.

<sup>13</sup> U.S. Marine Corps, *Professional Military Education, MCO 1553.4B* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Marine Corps, 2008), 2.

with the joint education requirements outlined earlier, the order prescribes participation in both the Professional Reading Program and the life-long Professional Self-Study Program for Marines. Because the order contains minimal guidance for civilian Marines, the Commandant produced an additional reference applicable to them

In 2008, the Commandant of the Marine Corps established civilian Professional Military Education (PME) requirements through the Marine Civilian Workforce Campaign Plan (MCWCP). This plan clearly defines program requirements, objectives, policies, and responsibilities for all civilian Marines. Both the MCWCP and MCO 1553.4B encourage civilian Marine participation in the Professional Reading Program and the life-long Professional Self-Study Program for Marines.<sup>14</sup>

Portions of Marine Corps PME are not fully conducive to developing an appreciation of joint warfare. GNA recognized and targeted these deficiencies by focusing on officer education programs. Despite their importance, officer programs account for only a small portion of the Marine Corps' joint competency. This chapter explores individual education opportunities for all Marines, highlighting program-specific shortfalls in officer, enlisted and civilian programs. Once identified, the chapter considers the implications.

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<sup>14</sup> U.S. Marine Corps, *Marine Civilian Workforce Campaign Plan, MCWCP* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Marine Corps, 2008), 4.

## **Officer Education Programs**

Since ratification of GNA, numerous congressionally mandated studies and panels led to the refinement of existing officer PME programs. Marine Corps resident officer PME programs received the focus of these efforts so that now officer PME programs reflect accredited levels of joint objectives, criteria, and standards.<sup>15</sup> When compared to enlisted and civilian programs, resident officer programs contain the greatest joint exposure in content, faculty, and student population. Although accredited, notable gaps exist in today's officer education programs.

### **USMC Career Level School, Expeditionary Warfare School**

On an annual basis the Marine Corps conducts a 10-month resident career level school (CLS), the Expeditionary Warfare School (EWS), for Marine company grade officers. This resident program maintains a curriculum focused on the tactical level of war, with a specific emphasis on MAGTF operations.<sup>16</sup> In compliance with the OPMEP, this program focuses on preparing junior officers to serve in their assigned branch, warfare or staff specialty. The curriculum contains embedded OPMEP joint learning areas. EWS provides the fundamental understanding of joint warfare necessary for success at the tactical level. Marine Corps officers fill 190 of 242 available student seats.<sup>17</sup> The CLS panel meets annually and slates attendees based on military occupational specialty, competitiveness, career progression and the needs of the Marine

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<sup>15</sup> CJCS, *Officer Professional Military Education Policy*, A-C-2.

<sup>16</sup> U.S. Congress, House Armed Services Committee, *Statement of Major General (sel) Melvin Spiese, USMC Commanding General Training and Education Command*, July 28, 2009, 8-9.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, 4.

Corps. Sister services and international officers fill remaining quotas, establishing a relatively diverse student population.

EWS challenges students to think critically. The learning environment consists of fifteen conference groups, each containing a diverse mix of backgrounds and military occupational specialties (MOS). Students interact in a variety of classroom settings, mentored by a senior officer simultaneously designated a faculty advisor (FACAD). Instructional emphasis is on command and control, combined arms operations, warfighting skills, tactical decision-making, MAGTF operations and Naval Expeditionary Operations.<sup>18</sup> EWS produces graduates prepared to command or serve as a primary staff officer in their specific MOS. The curriculum integrates fundamental level joint concepts, focused on the roles and responsibilities of a Joint Task Force (JTF). Additionally the curriculum contains dedicated joint staff integration concepts like joint warfare fundamentals and joint campaigning.

There are no OPMEP requirements with respect to CLS population mixes. However, during academic year 2009, the EWS student population consisted of 190 Marine Corps officers, 2 United States Navy officers, 22 Army and Army National Guard officers, 6 Air Force and Air National Guard officers, and 22 international military officers.<sup>19</sup> For academic year 2010, the selection board nominated 190 officers to attend the service course and 74 officers to attend the Army Captains Career Course (ACCC).

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<sup>18</sup> U.S. Congress, House Armed Services Committee, *Statement of Colonel Brian D. Beaudreault, USMC Director, U. S. Marine Corps Expeditionary Warfare School*, July 15, 2009, 6.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, 4.



This was from a population of 697 qualified to attend.<sup>20</sup> The remaining 433 officers, or 62 percent of the qualified population, must complete CLS as a non-resident program.

There are no OPMEP requirements with respect to CLS faculty diversity. However, the current faculty consists of fifteen Marine Corps officers and three Navy officers. Faculty members are selected through a rigorous screening process. Each instructor is a subject matter expert in his/her respective fields. Seven hold Masters Degrees from the Services Command and Staff Colleges and two more hold Masters Degrees from civilian universities. 100 percent of the FACADs and division heads are highly experienced combat veterans with grade appropriate command and staff experience.<sup>21</sup>

In summary, Marine Corps CLS, resident EWS, contains an entry-level exposure to a joint context with respect to student composition, faculty and learning methodology. Because the course primarily focuses on tactical skill sets, it is insufficient in preparing junior officers for the full cultural demands of joint operations. Subsequent levels of PME provide more enhanced joint exposures. Regrettably, only 38 percent of the eligible population may take full advantage of this opportunity through resident participation with the remainder missing the opportunity for physical immersion into the diverse seminar environment and exposure to the jointly acculturated faculty.

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<sup>20</sup> U.S. Marine Corps, *Academic Year 2010-2011 (AY10-11) Career Level School (CLS) Selection Panel Results, MARADMIN 555/09*, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Marine Corps, 2009).

<sup>21</sup> U.S. Congress, *Statement of Colonel Brian D. Beaudreault*, 5.

### *USMC Intermediate Level College, Command and Staff College*

The Marine Corps also conducts a 10-month intermediate level college (ILC), Command and Staff College (CSC), for field grade officers. This course is JPME Phase I accredited by the Joint Staff.<sup>22</sup> CSC maintains a curriculum focused on relationships between the strategic, operational and tactical levels of war. Students expand their understanding of joint force deployment and employment at the operational level. The curriculum places a specific emphasis on planning.<sup>23</sup> In compliance with OPMEP guidance, CSC students focus on warfighting within the context of operational art. Students develop a more thorough understanding of joint and service perspectives. Within the “Warfighting from the Sea” block of instruction, CSC students participate in joint and coalition war game exercises.<sup>24</sup> In the context of joint seminars, the curriculum introduces theater strategy and plans, national military strategy, and national security strategy and policy.<sup>25</sup>

The CSC curriculum develops student’s analytic capabilities and creative thought processes. The learning environment consists of twelve conference groups, each containing a diverse mix of backgrounds and military occupational specialties (MOS). In contrast with EWS, the CSC student body consists of only 50% Marines.<sup>26</sup> Conference

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<sup>22</sup> CJCS, *Officer Professional Military Education Policy*, A-C-2.

<sup>23</sup> U.S. Congress. House Armed Services Committee, *Statement of Colonel Raymond C. Damm, Jr., USMC Director, Marine Corps Command and Staff College*. June 25, 2009, 7.

<sup>24</sup> U.S. Congress, *Statement of Major General (sel) Melvin Spiese*, 5.

<sup>25</sup> CJCS, *Officer Professional Military Education Policy*, A-A-4.

<sup>26</sup> U.S. Congress, *Statement of Colonel Raymond C. Damm, Jr.*, 2.

group compositions and student to faculty ratios comply with OPMEP standards.<sup>27</sup> CSC produces graduates prepared to command or serve as a primary staff officer for service, joint, multinational or high-level service organizations.<sup>28</sup>

Compared to CLS, the percentages of resident openings are even fewer. For academic year 2010, there were 156 total school seats available.<sup>29</sup> Similar to CLS selection, a board convenes and slates attendees based on competitiveness, career progression and the needs of the Marine Corps. From the total number of eligible officers, the board selected only 23 percent.<sup>30</sup> The remaining 77 percent of qualified officers, 522 individuals, are required to complete ILC through non-resident programs in order to enhance their eligibility for promotion.

In summary, Marine Corps ILC, resident CSC, contains an improved joint context over EWS with respect to student composition, faculty and learning methodology and maintains accreditation by the Joint Staff. However, CSC does not provide universal benefit to the majority of Marine officers due to the low number of available seats. As a result, more than three quarters of all Marine officers in these grades must participate in the non-resident program, possibly missing the intangible aspects of physical

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<sup>27</sup> CJCS, *Officer Professional Military Education Policy*, B-3.

<sup>28</sup> U.S. Marine Corps, *Professional Military Education*, Enclosure (1), 1-8.

<sup>29</sup> U.S. Marine Corps, *Academic Year 2010 (AY10) Intermediate Level School (ILS) Selection Board Results, MARADMIN 014/10*, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Marine Corps, 2010).

<sup>30</sup> Ibid.

participation in a joint seminar environment. However, for those who do attend, it provides the essential background required prior to attendance at the next level of PME.

**USMC Senior Level College, Marine Corps War College (MCWAR)**

Beyond CSC, the Marine Corps conducts a 10-month senior level college (SLC) program, Marine Corps War College (MCWAR) for a very limited number of field grade officers. This course is JPME Phase II accredited by the Joint Staff.<sup>31</sup> MCWAR prepares graduates for decision making during war and military operations other than war in a joint and multinational environment.<sup>32</sup> Students expand their understanding of joint force deployment and employment at the strategic level. The academic atmosphere challenges student assumptions and explores new and novel approaches to national security.<sup>33</sup> In compliance with OPMEP guidance, MCWAR students learn to develop, integrate and apply the instruments of national power (diplomatic, informational, military and economic) during both peace and war. The academic syllabus at MCWAR emphasizes analysis, fosters critical examination, encourages creativity and provides a progressively broader educational experience for attending students. Besides to the joint exposures that the students receive in the classroom, they participate in a capstone 6-day multi-war college Joint Land Aerospace Sea Simulation (JLASS) exercise at Maxwell AFB. During

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<sup>31</sup> CJCS, *Officer Professional Military Education Policy*, A-C-2.

<sup>32</sup> U.S. Marine Corps, *Professional Military Education*, Enclosure (1), 1-11.

<sup>33</sup> U.S. Congress. House Armed Services Committee. *Statement of Colonel Michael F. Belcher, USMC Director, Marine Corps War College*, 4 June, 2009, 3.

this event, sister-service war colleges participate in a simulated exercise, emphasizing both joint and interagency cooperation.<sup>34</sup>

The MCWAR curriculum employs active, adult-oriented teaching methods. Students receive instruction in a variety of environments including seminars, case studies, practical exercises, battle staff rides and research projects. MCWAR challenges students to think critically and creatively about enduring and emerging national security issues. The learning environment consists of two conference groups, each containing a wide array of occupational specialties and backgrounds. The student body consists of only 47% Sea Service officers (US Navy and Marine Corps).<sup>35</sup> Conference group compositions and student-to-faculty ratios comply with OPMEP standards.<sup>36</sup> MCWAR provides graduates a “world class education” enabling them intellectual preparation for the multitude of challenges they will face as national leaders.<sup>37</sup>

Compared to CLS and ILC, the availability of SLC seats is significantly lower. For academic year 2010, the selection board nominated eight officers to attend MCWAR with 91<sup>38</sup> additional officers designated to attend other resident SLC programs.<sup>39</sup> This

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<sup>34</sup> U.S. Congress, *Statement of Major General (sel) Melvin Spiese*, 5.

<sup>35</sup> U.S. Congress, *Statement of Colonel Michael F. Belcher*, 6.

<sup>36</sup> CJCS, *Officer Professional Military Education Policy*, B-3.

<sup>37</sup> U.S. Marine Corps, *Professional Military Education*, 1-8.

<sup>38</sup> U.S. Marine Corps, *Academic Year (AY) 10-11 Top Level School (TLS) Selection Board Results, MARADMIN 052/10*, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Marine Corps, 2010).

<sup>39</sup> Other SLC nominations include the Air War College, Army War College, College of Naval Warfare, Industrial College of the Armed Forces, National War College, and the Joint Advanced Warfighting School.

benefits only 13.8 percent of the eligible population. Very few non-resident programs exist for the remainder of the eligible population. The Army provides the only available non-resident SLC equivalent course.<sup>40</sup> As a result, limited opportunities exist for the remaining 618 qualified officers to complete SLC. Most never do.

In summary, Marine Corps SLC, MCWAR, contains an OPMEP compliant and adequate joint context in student composition, faculty and learning methodology and maintains accreditation by the Joint Staff. However, this opportunity to enhance jointness for individuals only extends to the 14 percent of the Marine Corps senior leadership afforded the opportunity to attend and suggests significant gaps, which can only be mitigated through self-study, experience, or other educational opportunities.

#### **USMC Non-Resident Programs**

While Title X, section 38 prevents services from legally requiring PME completion as a prerequisite to promotion, all promotion boards formally consider it “indicative of an officer’s desire to seek professional growth and may make the officer more competitive for promotion.”<sup>41</sup> This sentiment is evident in the results of officer promotion boards for fiscal year 2011.<sup>42</sup> Because promotion boards consider PME so important and resident seats are limited, non-resident programs are the primary sources for obtaining completion credit. As highlighted earlier, during the 2010 academic year,

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<sup>40</sup> U.S. Congress, *Statement of Colonel Michael F. Belcher*, 14.

<sup>41</sup> U.S. Marine Corps, *Professional Military Education*, Enclosure (1) 1-1.

<sup>42</sup> Upon review of the FY2011 Captain, Major, Lieutenant Colonel and Colonel promotion board results, less than 1% of officers eligible in zone were selected for promotion if incomplete with required PME.

1,573 out of a qualified population of 2,092 officers (75 percent) were required to complete a non-resident version of PME due to limited resident quotas. Since the majority of Marine officers complete PME via non-resident courses, these programs warrant a detailed analysis as the non-attending officers cannot benefit from the critical joint acculturation that the resident activities provide.

Each resident program outlined in previous sections, with the exception of MCWAR, maintains a corresponding service non-resident program. The College of Continuing Education (CCE) Distance Education Program (DEP) manages and conducts these non-resident programs. The CCE is responsible for defining, developing and implementing all distance education courses in collaboration with the appropriate resident course.<sup>43</sup> Participation occurs through either on-line forums or on-site seminar programs.

Influenced by suggestions from the most recent PAJE team visit in 2004, the CCE embarked on transforming its distance education methods. Beginning in the fall of 2004, the CCE transformed non-resident PME from an independent correspondence program with a seminar option to a seminar-only based program. “This seminar-delivered, intermediate level JPME now provides a seminar learning environment for all students and continues to close the gap between resident intermediate-level education and its distance counterpart.”<sup>44</sup> Recent seminars included representation from other services.

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<sup>43</sup> U.S. Marine Corps, *Professional Military Education*, 3.

<sup>44</sup> Terence K. Kerrigan and James I. Van Zummeren, *Marine Corps Command and Staff College Process for Accreditation of Joint Education (PAJE) Self-Study Report* (Quantico, Virginia: Marine Corps University, 2008), 1.

Technological advances provided the capability to conduct “hybrid resident/non-resident” seminars starting in 2007. This program includes international officers as 50% of the student population. The hybrid program consists of two resident phases of about six weeks combined with 26 weeks of collaborative on-line seminar. The participating population has doubled since its establishment including Army officers, Air Force officers, as well as government civilians.<sup>45</sup>

A network of regional coordinators leads all non-resident course seminars utilizing globally synchronized courseware. The courseware presented during non-resident courses is identical to that presented in resident format. The CCE maintains a Course Content Review Board (CCRB) process to ensure courseware currency and relevancy. As described in the 2008 PAJE Self Study Guide:

*The many changes occurring in joint doctrine, procedures, and operations are incorporated into the resident CSC curriculum as the JPME coordinator, course directors, and subject matter expert’s review newly released doctrine and professional literature to identify joint content. These changes, combined with the results of the CSCDEP [Command and Staff College Distance Education Program] CCRB process are then incorporated into the CSCDEP curriculum by the CCE academics department.*<sup>46</sup>

As evidenced above, the courseware and delivery methods of Marine Corps officer non-resident programs have improved dramatically since 2004. The supervision provided by regional coordinators creates a more rigorous academic environment than existed previously. Large percentages of adjunct faculty bring teaching experience and a wealth

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<sup>45</sup> U.S. Congress, *Statement of Major General (sel) Melvin Spiese*, 9.

<sup>46</sup> Kerrigan and Van Zummeren, *Marine Corps Command and Staff College Self-Study Report*, 10.



of knowledge that complement the curriculum and enrich student learning.<sup>47</sup> Despite these improvements, non-resident programs remain less effective in providing joint acculturation than resident courses due to student composition and faculty limitations. While appearing minor, these are two of the three critical OPMEP components identified as essential to an effective joint context.<sup>48</sup>

Resident accredited programs maintain a required ratio of host service students to non-host service students. Per the OPMEP, service SLCs shall have “no more than 60 percent host Military Department student representation across their student bodies.”<sup>49</sup> OPMEP requirements dictates that schools maintain at least one officer from each of the two non-host Military Departments in each seminar. At first glance this appears to create an effective joint mix. However, it suggests a narrow view of jointness within the OPMEP, particularly if the individual non-host student happens to comprise a non-representative sample of the sister service (for example: a USAF logistician or a Naval intelligence officer).

GNA ratification sparked debates over seminar composition requirements that continue today. One side of the argument seeks to minimize the number of seats offered to other services in order to allow more host-service officer school seats. The opposite side prefers seminars with a wide variety of service representation. Congress accepted the

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<sup>47</sup> Ibid., 16.

<sup>48</sup> U.S. Marine Corps, *Professional Military Education*, B-1 thru B-3.

<sup>49</sup> Ibid., B-1.

later opinion. The authors provide an excellent summary of why this factor is so critical in their article on “Joint Education in the United States.” They state that the seminar environment itself maintains a “special importance”<sup>50</sup> where all members participate in discussions. The students also participate in war gaming and problem solving exercises. “With so much of the education generated by the seminar itself, one can see the difficulty in coming up with a true joint answer to a problem of force employment, for instance, in a room composed of twelve ... officers [from the same service].”<sup>51</sup>

OPMEP faculty ratio requirements are comparable to minimum student seminar ratios. For service ILCs, military faculty members should be a minimum of five percent from each non-host Military Department. For service SLCs, the mix of faculty members should be proportionally divided among each non-host Military Department.<sup>52</sup> Most non-resident adjunct faculty members are either active duty or recently retired Marines.

Further complicating the non-resident programs is the fact that operational tempo interferes with program completion. Officers simultaneously complete their education while executing daily missions. In contrast, resident programs provide an atmosphere devoted to learning that is impossible to achieve during non-resident education. Dr. John Williams, a proponent of resident PME, provided the following in his testimony before the House Armed Services committee in September of 2009:

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<sup>50</sup> Kennedy and Neilson, *Military Education*, 161.

<sup>51</sup> Ibid., 161.

<sup>52</sup> CJCS, *Officer Professional Military Education Policy*, B-2.

*Educational experiences will help students develop the intellectual capital they will need later in their careers, even if its immediate relevance is not apparent. Although continuing professional education should be expected, demanding operational billets are not conducive to systematic thought and reflection – emphasizing the importance of a period of residential study.*<sup>53</sup>

According to Dr. Williams, there can be no substitute for resident PME, despite the quality of the distance-learning program. Systematic thought and dedicated reflection time are critical to effective learning.

In summary, non-resident officer PME programs are the primary source of PME for 75 percent of Marine officers. These programs have two significant shortfalls when presenting joint exposure to participating students. All but a few programs fail to provide a joint student seminar-learning environment. Even fewer provide faculty members from services outside the Marine Corps. Exacerbating these deficiencies is the lack of dedicated time away from current operational demands to reflect on the material learned during non-resident courses.

### **Enlisted Education Programs**

Although joint exposure shortfalls exist within the current officer PME continuum, an even greater deficit exists within current EPME programs. Joint matters affect all service members, not just officers. The Marine Corps enlisted population is

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<sup>53</sup> U.S. Congress, House Armed Services Committee, *Statement of Dr. John Allen Williams, Professor of Political Science, Loyola University Chicago, Chair and President Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society*, 10 September, 2009, 4.

178,317 in contrast to an officer population of 20,188.<sup>54</sup> Further, enlisted personnel hold as many if not more positions in joint organizations than officers. However, opportunities for enlisted joint education and exposure are much more limited.

While Marine Corps EPME programs are not new, enhancing them to include an appreciation for joint warfare most certainly is. Marine Corps EPME programs lack accreditation with respect to joint context, as there is no defined accreditation process.<sup>55</sup> Given the absence of a legislative mandate, current CJCS policies regarding joint accreditation of EPME will likely remain unchanged.

The professional development of enlisted Marines consists of a progressive integration of MOS-specific combat skills and PME. The process uses a building block approach with subsequent schools building on topics from previously completed courses.<sup>56</sup> The majority of entry-level courses are correspondence programs with some resident schools available to E-5s and above. Enlisted PME is currently undergoing a “dynamic transformation” from basic knowledge based courseware modules to an interactive, more rigorous performance-based system.<sup>57</sup> During this transition, updated material will incorporate applicable Joint Learning Areas (JLA) derived from the EPMEP. These enhancements, listed in Appendix B, establish a continuum within the

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<sup>54</sup> U.S. Marine Corps, *United States Marine Corps Concepts and Programs 2009*, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Marine Corps, 2009), 259.

<sup>55</sup> CJCS, *Enlisted Professional Military Education Policy*, C-1.

<sup>56</sup> U.S. Marine Corps, *Professional Military Education*, p 2-1.

<sup>57</sup> Ibid.

EPME process. It would benefit Marine Corps University (MCU) to review lessons learned from the late 1990's officer transition from the Marine Corps Institute (MCI) to the CCE to improve the quality and availability of EPME.

**Enlisted Introductory and Primary Level PME**

Introductory level PME is applicable to enlisted Marines from the rank of Private (E-1) to Lance Corporal (E-3).<sup>58</sup> Primary level PME is applicable to enlisted Marines with the rank of either Corporal (E-4) or Sergeant (E-5).<sup>59</sup> A detailed overview of current PME methodology is found in Appendix C. Both levels include specific joint emphasis area requirements. Described in the EPMEP as “national military capabilities” and “armed forces overview,”<sup>60</sup> these fundamental topics provide the basic building blocks for EJPME.

While the courseware contains joint topics required by the EPMEP, neither the faculty nor the student population provides a joint exposure. Non-resident courses are self-taught. Resident courses allow for limited numbers of both sister-service and international students, however, the percentages are very small. In conclusion, an exposure to a joint seminar environment for young enlisted Marines is absent from all but a handful of venues during introductory and primary level PME. The sole joint context consists of a small portion of the academic material designed to provide the foundation for follow-on levels of EPME.

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<sup>58</sup> CJCS, *Enlisted Professional Military Education Policy*, A-A-2.

<sup>59</sup> Ibid.

<sup>60</sup> Ibid., A-A-A-1.

### **Enlisted Intermediate Level PME**

Intermediate level PME is applicable to enlisted Marines from the rank of Staff Sergeant (E-6) to Gunnery Sergeant (E-7).<sup>61</sup> The Marine Corps maintains both resident and nonresident enlisted intermediate level PME courses. A detailed synopsis of USMC enlisted intermediate level PME is located in Appendix D.

All versions of intermediate level enlisted PME include specific joint emphasis area requirements.<sup>62</sup> While the courseware contains joint topics required by the EPMEP, there is limited joint diversity in either the faculty or the student population. Intermediate level resident PME for both Staff Sergeants and Gunnery Sergeants do provision for limited numbers of both sister service and international students, however, the percentages are very small. An exposure to a diverse joint seminar for intermediate level enlisted Marines is absent from all but a handful of venues during intermediate level PME.

By reviewing current programs, it is apparent that limited opportunities exist for exposure to a joint seminar environment for mid-level enlisted Marines. The sole joint context derives from the academic material designed to build upon the exposure received earlier in the EPME continuum and prepare the Marine for the next phase of education.

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<sup>61</sup> Ibid., A-A-2.

<sup>62</sup> Ibid., A-A-A-1.

### **Enlisted Senior Level PME**

Enlisted senior level PME opportunities are solely resident programs. They consist of regional seminars and, for First Sergeants, a dedicated First Sergeant's Course.<sup>63</sup> In 2009, the Marine Corps developed a formal Senior Enlisted PME Course designed to equip Marines in the grades of Master Sergeant (E-8) through Sergeant Major (E-9) with the critical thinking and adaptive skills required to function at the operational and strategic levels of war.<sup>64</sup> Seats are very limited with only 90 quotas available for fiscal year 2010.<sup>65</sup> Nomination requires enrollment in the Senior Enlisted Joint PME (SEJPME) Course prior to attending. The Joint Forces Staff College offers this course via distance-learning modules.

Senior level enlisted PME includes specific joint emphasis area requirements, particularly when completed in combination with SEJPME. Unlike earlier levels, enlisted senior level PME includes no sister service or international students. Opportunities to experience a joint classroom seminar are not available to the highest-ranking senior enlisted Marines. Once again, the joint context derives solely from the academic material and the shared experiences of fellow senior Marine enlisted students within the courses. This is hardly sufficient to meet the realistic jointness demands required of senior enlisted personnel serving in joint commands.

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<sup>63</sup> U.S. Marine Corps, *Announcement of the 2010 Senior Enlisted PME Course*, MARADMIN 679/09, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Marine Corps, 2009).

<sup>64</sup> Ibid.

<sup>65</sup> Ibid.

### **Additional Obstacles Common to Enlisted PME Programs**

Even more critical are the cultural obstacles to EPME. In 2007, the Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) completed a study on the cultural perceptions of EPME. Participants included officers and enlisted personnel of all ranks and backgrounds. The results highlighted deficiencies in both content and availability of EPME. A highly relevant finding from this survey discovered that:

*Respondents were in strong agreement that SNCO [staff non-commissioned officer] training and education is extremely beneficial to the Marine Corps and to the individual Marine. PME helps to build a better rounded Marine SNCO, one who can function in any number of leadership and staff billets. [Resident] PME also helps the individual Marine to build a network of points of contact, duty experts and peers to answer questions from time to time. Besides offering advice to their respective officers, SNCOs are considered invaluable to the efficiency of any Marine unit.<sup>66</sup>*

The benefits of resident EPME directly parallel resident officer PME. Unfortunately, the survey indicated that potential benefits provided by EPME remain unfulfilled due to a lack of command emphasis on attendance.<sup>67</sup> The survey showed that many commands, while understanding the importance of EPME, felt that they could not afford to lose enlisted members from their unit for the time required to attend resident courses. As such, most enlisted Marines lack opportunities for attendance in residence. Reinforcing the results of this survey were the enrollment percentages recently presented by Sergeant Major Rick Hawkins of Marine Corps Education Command at the Commander's Course

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<sup>66</sup> Monte E. Dunard, *Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned Report: Staff NCO Training and Education Observations and Feedback*, 2 March 2007, 12.

<sup>67</sup> Ibid.



in Quantico, which indicates that every course since 2007 commenced with unfilled seats. Some years enrollment was as low as 58 percent full while others it was as high as 92 percent with annual attendance averaging 81 percent.<sup>68</sup> Preventing Marines from attending PME seems a short-sighted practice in this intensive era of joint operations.<sup>69</sup>

In conclusion, the absence of jointly populated seminars and joint faculty are common themes across the continuum of Marine Corps EPME. Low availability and utilization of EPME opportunities is also prevalent throughout the continuum. These factors combine to illustrate a significant joint exposure shortfall in the enlisted population of the Marine Corps affecting nearly 90 percent of the service population.

### **Civilian Marine Education Programs**

The Marine Corps recognizes the critical importance of its civilian workforce. The service employs over 30,000 civilians, a significant portion of the total force.<sup>70</sup> Civilian employees bring additional skills to the total force and provide capacity to accomplish a broader spectrum of tasks. Unlike their active and reserve military partners, civilians have fewer formal opportunities to complete formal service education.

Until recently, the service lacked a strategic vision for the service acculturation of these individuals. In compliance with *DoDI 1400.25, Civilian Personnel Management*, the service established a strategic roadmap defining current and future civilian education

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<sup>68</sup> Richard Hawkins, "Enlisted PME," (lecture, Marine Corps University, Quantico, Virginia, November 19, 2006), 20, 25, 30.

<sup>69</sup> Chiarelli, "Training Full Spectrum," 21.

<sup>70</sup> U.S. Marine Corps, *United States Marine Corps Concepts and Programs 2009*, 176.

requirements. In 2008, the Commandant of the Marine Corps developed the Marine Civilian Workforce Campaign Plan (MCWCP). This document, in combination with the 2005 Master Labor Agreement, establishes priorities and programs for the intellectual development of the Marine civilian workforce.<sup>71</sup> Like EPME, the law does not mandate civilian education. However, the need for the expansion of joint competency throughout the service clearly indicates a requirement to expand JPME to civilian Marines.

A significant portion of the strategic roadmap defines an employee lifecycle model. Within the acculturation phase of this lifecycle, the service identifies specific methods for enhancing their understanding of the service. Specific goals include knowledge of the Marine Corps, its culture, and its history. Providing other educational opportunities to employees facilitates their professional development. The Civilian Workforce Management Branch (MPC), Manpower Plans and Policy Division, Manpower and Reserve Affairs, developed and continues to implement this comprehensive civilian workforce initiative.

In July of 2009, MajGen M. Spiese, Commanding General, Training and Education Command, testified before the House Armed Services Committee regarding Marine Corps PME. During that testimony, he highlighted the importance of PME for civilian Marines. He stated that programs, while still in their infancy, “are particularly important as more and more civilians assume leadership positions within our Corps.”<sup>72</sup>

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<sup>71</sup> U.S. Marine Corps, *Marine Civilian Workforce Campaign Plan*, 3.

<sup>72</sup> U.S. Congress, *Statement of Major General (sel) Melvin Spiese*, 10.

The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review Report (QDR) also highlighted an imperative for the training and education of the civilian workforce. The QDR states that an “effort is underway to synchronize civilian and military leadership training, with the goals of ensuring common professional training and education ... increasing joint capability.”<sup>73</sup>

Like active duty service members, an exposure to joint concepts and capabilities is critical for civilian Marines. Even in this initial stage of transformation, there are already 12 courses available to civilian Marines specifically designed to deliver comprehension of joint and service perspectives.<sup>74</sup> However, opportunities for civilian participation in resident officer and enlisted PME programs remain limited. The Marine Corps University is working alongside Manpower and Reserve Affairs to establish a set of opportunities for these individuals. However, until establishment of these programs occurs, a deficiency will exist in the number of civilian employees exposed to jointness through formal education. Incorporating explicit civilian PME requirements in subsequent revisions of MCO 1553.4B would assist in program development.

### **Additional Marine Corps Joint Education Opportunities**

The Marine Corps Life-Long Professional Study Program exists outside the formal structures outlined above, but is applicable to officers, enlisted Marines, and civilians alike. Participation requires determination, self-study, and individual discipline. Despite the program’s obvious value, there are no formal mechanisms enforcing

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<sup>73</sup> Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report 2010* (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 2010), 55.

<sup>74</sup> Booz Allen Hamilton, *U.S. Marine Corps Civilian Leadership Development Training Course Catalog Version 1.0* (McLean, Virginia: Booz Allen Hamilton, 11 October 2002), 55-56.

participation. Elements of the program include the Commandant's Reading List, conference attendance, battle studies, staff rides, professional writing, and off-duty civilian education.<sup>75</sup> The intent of this program is to broaden the individual participant's foundation in the profession of arms. Headquarters Marine Corps established Learning Centers at every major installation to coordinate the program. Countless opportunities for self-paced learning exist as facilitated by libraries, tuition assistance, transcript registry services, opportunity colleges, scholarship programs and an interface with the Marine Corps Institute for distance learning.<sup>76</sup> Unfortunately, there are no dedicated joint training opportunities in the current system. However, linking Learning Centers with either the Joint Knowledge Online (JKO) repository of courseware or JFCOM's Joint Knowledge Development and Distribution Capability (JKDDC) would create a powerful joint teaching opportunity.

In 1988, General A. M. Gray initiated the Marine Corps Professional Reading Program. The intent of the program, initially entitled the "Commandant's Reading List," was to provide a continuum of study for all Marine leaders.<sup>77</sup> Participation in the Professional Reading Program adds valuable exposure to historical events. Many books provide a joint exposure to the reader. Designed with the unpredictable future environment in mind, the publications expose readers to "tremendous experiences that

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<sup>75</sup> U.S. Marine Corps, *Professional Military Education*, 4.

<sup>76</sup> U.S. Marine Corps, MCCS: Lifelong Learning Education and Information Solutions, <http://www.usmc-mccs.org/education/programs.cfm?sid=ml&smid=5> (accessed March 3, 2010).

<sup>77</sup> U.S. Marine Corps, *Professional Military Education*, 4.

men and women have gained over the ages concerning the nature and conduct of war.”<sup>78</sup> Many of the experiences documented in the books of the Professional Reading Program are joint. *Defeat into Victory* by Field Marshal William Slim, *Flags of our Fathers* by James Bradley, and *Imperial Grunts* by Robert Kaplan are but three examples of books on the list meeting this criteria.<sup>79</sup> A detailed summary of the Marine Corps Professional Reading Program is contained in Appendix E.

### **Implications**

As identified above, portions of Marine Corps PME lack important characteristics that would be conducive to developing an appreciation of joint warfare. To amend for this, several corrections seem relevant. First, the service must continue to improve non-resident officer PME. These efforts must account for the central role of the distance learning and distributed education techniques that educate 75 percent of the qualified population. Enhancing these systems require more resources and effort. Second, joint education for enlisted personnel must continue to improve in similar fashion. Over 2,200 men and women in the grades E-7 through E-9 support the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Combatant Commander staffs and standing JTFs. Even more serve in contingency JTFs.<sup>80</sup> These individuals require knowledge about the cultures and capabilities of other

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<sup>78</sup> U.S. Marine Corps, *Marine Corps Professional Reading Program*, ALMAR 007/05, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Marine Corps, 2005).

<sup>79</sup> U.S. Marine Corps, *2010 Marine Corps Professional Reading Program Pamphlet*, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Marine Corps, 2010), [http://www.mcu.usmc.mil/lejeune\\_leadership/LLI%20Documnets/2010ProReadingBrochure.pdf](http://www.mcu.usmc.mil/lejeune_leadership/LLI%20Documnets/2010ProReadingBrochure.pdf) (accessed on January 2, 2010).

<sup>80</sup> John Driscoll, “Developing Joint Education for the Total Force,” *Joint Force Quarterly*, Spring 2000, 1.

services as well as techniques for mentoring the soldiers, sailors, and airmen working in the same environment. Finally, joint education opportunities for the civilian workforce remain limited until expansion efforts are complete.

Mission accomplishment in future conflicts requires personnel educated in both the conduct of war and the employment of combat forces within joint forces. Yet jointness is absent from a significant portion of Marine Corps educational culture. Absent an educational exposure to joint capabilities and cultures, Marine Corps service members will gravitate toward Marine Corps specific solutions. The nation demands service men and women steeped in an understanding of jointness that enables them to fight more effectively as a joint force. Victory in the critical battles of tomorrow requires the strength created through all armed forces working together.

Marines have a great heritage, well known for their desire to seek continuously more effective ways to accomplish the mission. However, future conflicts will demand improved utilization of joint forces. To maximize their effective contribution to the future force, Marines must develop an appreciation for all components of the joint force. This is possible only through improved educational experiences that share best practices, innovation, lessons learned, and other service approaches to mission accomplishment. Without an enhanced educational exposure to sister service capabilities and cultures, the operational capability of future Marine forces will be impacted. A lack of knowledge regarding other service capabilities on the battlefield may lead to improper force employment or even mission failure.

The Marine Corps develops, grows, and promotes individuals demonstrating the highest potential. The service keeps many of these individuals in key leadership positions throughout their careers. Moreover, while the individual develops skills valuable to the needs of the Marine Corps, it often comes at a cost to the joint force, particularly in the context of the shortfalls identified above in officer, enlisted and civilian joint education. Nevertheless, as Marines progress through their careers, they will eventually participate as a member of a joint force. At that point, they must be well versed in joint concepts and their application. Inasmuch as is practical, prior educational experiences should introduce these concepts. Marines, insulated from joint exposure through education, may remain competitive within the service, but they will lack the joint mindedness necessary to contribute effectively. That is unless training opportunities are able to make up for the exposed deficits in educational programs.

## CHAPTER III: TRAINING

The history of warfare confirms a direct correlation between training and victory. Successful combat units train as they intend to fight and fight as they were trained.<sup>1</sup> Marines base their future battlefield successes on this philosophy. However, effective training is an endless challenge and resource limitations will always have a negative impact on training quality. Combat training in peacetime reinforces education by developing, preserving, and improving the skills required for the sound application of military power. Among other things, training serves as a venue for validation and reinforcement of ideas imparted during education. Formal Marine Corps training, while outstanding at the tactical level, lacks sufficient exposure to joint and operational enablers complexity. This chapter explores this deficiency with its potential implications.

Since the late 1960's, the armed forces of the United States and the Marine Corps have devoted significant energy and resources toward fielding forces with high levels of first battle tactical competence. Motivating these efforts was the recognition that most individual combat losses occur during early missions when inexperienced combatants were prone to costly mistakes.<sup>2</sup> The traditional focus of training is at the tactical level. The development of large scale service Combat Training Centers (CTC) like the Nevada Nellis range complex, the National Training Center at Fort Irwin California, and the Marine Air Ground Combat Center in 29 Palms California facilitated the accomplishment of realistic tactical training. The fruits of this labor resulted in a demonstrated level of

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<sup>1</sup> U.S. Marine Corps, *Unit Training Management Guide, MCRP 3-0A* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Marine Corps, 1996), 11.

<sup>2</sup> Watts, *US Combat Training*, viii.



first battle competence as reflected in the major tactical successes of Operation Desert Storm in 1991, Operation Enduring Freedom in 2001, and Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003. However, as noted in the JFCOM OIF Major Combat Operations Lessons Learned, “training provided an insurmountable warfighting edge at the tactical level, while critical operational level capabilities remained essentially untrained.”<sup>3</sup>

The U.S. Congress conducted extensive debriefs in the wake of Desert Storm.<sup>4</sup> These discussions documented a number of lessons learned that apply today and indicate implications for future training. Leaders testified that while service emphasis on repetitive individual and small unit training should continue, an emphasis on battle staff training should increase. They noted weaknesses in the command and control of support organizations during combat due to limited training with combat forces during peacetime. They also indicated that:

*A greater emphasis was needed on joint training, including planning; coordination; interoperability; and common understanding of procedures, processes, and terminology, and that joint training should not be limited to large-scale exercises, but include contingency operations of varying sizes.*<sup>5</sup>

Although collected in 1994, these observations are applicable to training today. As one officer recently stated: “Going into a joint environment in support of OIF and OEF at the

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<sup>3</sup> U.S. Joint Forces Command, *Joint Lessons Learned: Operation Iraqi Freedom Major Combat Operations* (Ft. Belvoir, Virginia: Defense Technical Information Center, 2004), 39.

<sup>4</sup> U.S. Congress, *Final Report to Congress, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War*, April 1992, 40.

<sup>5</sup> U.S. Congress, House Armed Services Committee, *Service and Joint Training: Lessons Learned from Recent Conflicts*, March 10, 1994, 11.

tactical level is like joining a pickup basketball game. Plays are called as the game goes along and no one is familiar with the other players or their playlists.”<sup>6</sup>

While tactical competency is a critical component to success, integrated joint exercises deliver significant benefits at the operational level. Further, the development of “operational thinking”<sup>7</sup> is a critical component to integrated battle staff planning and joint command and control training. Notwithstanding multiple service participation, the training focus at the CTCs is traditionally tactical with minimal effort placed on joint integration concepts. Large force exercises often simulate or omit critical joint and operational components. Additional weaknesses accentuated by the absence of a focus on operational thinking result in inadequate or inappropriate use of joint enablers not normally assigned to the exercise force. These often include fire support assets, intelligence data, reconnaissance capabilities, and the exercise and maintenance of communications equipment.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> Olgun Deveci, Rob Patrick, and Tom Whitlock, *Improving Joint Tactical Level Predeployment Training: Utilizing the Joint National Training Capability and the Joint Live Virtual Constructive Federation*, Point Paper, Joint and Combined Warfighting School, June 2008, 1.

<sup>7</sup> Dr. Milan N. Vego defines the term as follows: “Operational thinking is not identical to what the information warfare advocates call ‘situational awareness’ (SA): a term used in training one’s pilots; in its strict definition, situational awareness refers to the degree of accuracy with which one’s perception of his current environment mirrors reality; situational awareness does not necessarily also mean an understanding; it is purely a tactical, not operational or strategic, term; the extensive use of the term situational awareness in the U.S. and other militaries is perhaps one of the best proofs of the predominance of a narrow tactical perspective among information warfare advocates.” Vego, *Joint Operational Warfare*, page XI-15.

<sup>8</sup> U.S. Congress, *Service and Joint Training*, 9.

## Definition of a Joint Training Context

The background portion of a 2005 Government Accountability Office (GAO) Report to Congress on Military Training best articulates the concept of joint training context. The report states:

*Service military training has historically focused on individual service competencies, with less emphasis on joint operations involving joint commands, [and] other services . . . . While this has allowed the services to meet their core training responsibilities, it has also contributed to forces entering combat without having had previous experience or training in joint operations.<sup>9</sup>*

This describes the situation experienced by SPMAGTF-A, entering combat without effective training for the non-organic enablers found in theater.

The value of peacetime training can vary greatly. No exercise or war game accurately simulates the effect of friction or the sense of physical danger found in real combat. Yet experience shows that future operational commanders and their units can be sufficiently prepared for their wartime responsibilities through peacetime training. It is critical that future commanders and their units train to overcome the effects of friction in combat.<sup>10</sup> Through consideration of current service training methodologies, this analysis will identify shortfalls in joint context applied to Marine Corps training. However, prior to the analysis, a review of joint training requirements is in order.

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<sup>9</sup> U.S. Government Accountability Office, *Actions Needed to Enhance DOD's Program to Transform Joint Training* (Washington, D.C.: GAO, June 2005), 3.

<sup>10</sup> Vego, *Joint Operational Warfare*, XI-12.

## Joint Training Requirements

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff promulgates Joint Training requirements through *CJCSM 3500.03, The Joint Training Manual for the Armed Forces of the United States* or the JTM. This instruction provides policy to the services for development of joint task requirements, conduct of joint training and evaluation of command readiness relative to joint capabilities.

Readiness, defined as “the ability of US military forces to fight and meet the demands of the national military strategy and is the synthesis of two distinct but interrelated levels: unit readiness and joint readiness.”<sup>11</sup> Unit readiness is simply a rating of how capable a unit is to perform its assigned missions. Joint readiness is a rating of the combatant commander’s capability to “integrate and synchronize”<sup>12</sup> assigned units in the execution of his assigned missions. Effective training is essential to both levels of readiness.

The JTM divides joint training into three categories: individual, collective, and staff training. Individual training prepares individuals to perform duties within joint organizations or to operate uniquely joint systems. Collective training is a combination of instruction and exercises that facilitate unit mission accomplishment. Staff training is a combination of individual and collective training conducted by a unit’s organizational or

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<sup>11</sup> Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, JP 1-02*, (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2007), 454.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid.

operational staff.<sup>13</sup> The service is responsible for conducting all three types of joint training. Units are the primary objects of collective training while headquarters staffs are the primary objects of staff training. The Joint Staff has developed the Joint Training System (JTS) outlined in the JTM to facilitate the accomplishment of effective joint training. The JTS is a 4-phased methodology aligning training strategies with assigned missions in order to produce trained and ready individuals, units and staffs.<sup>14</sup> This next section of analysis will focus on Marine Corps utilization of the JTS in the conduct of both collective and service staff training.

### **Marine Corps Joint MAGTF Training**

Collective training is synonymous with unit training. While there are myriad unit size variations and compositions within the Marine Corps, Marine forces are typically organized and employed as Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs). MAGTFs offer the joint force commander rapidly deploying and self-sustaining forces capable of employment across a wide range of contingencies.<sup>15</sup> The paper will focus on training MAGTFs in two operationally pertinent scales, the Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) and the Marine Expeditionary Brigade or Force (MEB/MEF). While each of these units maintains a similar set of base requirements per the JTM, relevant training processes and standards differ.

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<sup>13</sup> CJCS. *Joint Training Manual*, A-4.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid., B-1.

<sup>15</sup> U.S. Marine Corps, *Marine Air-Ground Task Force Staff Training Program (MSTP)*, MCO 1500.53A, Washington, D.C., 2002. 1.

### **MAGTF Joint Training: Marine Expeditionary Units**

The Marine Corps provides national authorities and the Unified Combatant Commanders a certified, operationally flexible, sea-based forward presence in the form of MEU. Each MEU is a uniquely organized, trained and equipped expeditionary force, inherently balanced, sustainable, flexible, responsive, expandable, and credible. The four core capabilities resident in every MEU include amphibious operations, designated maritime special operations, military operations other than war, and supporting operations to include the introduction of follow-on forces.<sup>16</sup> Achievement of these core capabilities hinges on execution of a standardized rigorous preparation program labeled the MEU Predeployment Training Program (MEU PTP).

The MEU PTP is a systematic, standards-based process allowing the Amphibious Squadron (PHIBRON) and MEU commanders to analyze, develop and evaluate the capabilities of the Amphibious Ready Group (ARG). Execution of the MEU PTP takes place over a 26-week period of intense training, building upon the resident individual and unit capabilities of both the MEU Command Element (CE) and each Major Subordinate Element (MSE). While a great deal of the MEU PTP consists of service-specific requirements, the key to developing and enhancing the operational flexibility of the MEU is a set of required interoperability joint training and evaluation events.

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<sup>16</sup> U.S. Marine Corps, *Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) Predeployment Training Program, MCO 3502.3A*, Washington, D.C., 2004, 2.

Exercise coordinators design all training events to allow sufficient time for planning, execution and critique. The entire MEU PTP contains an embedded evaluation process culminating in a certification prior to deployment. Portions of the evaluation are informal and conducted by individual unit commanders within the MEU command structure.<sup>17</sup> These evaluations take place continuously during execution of the MEU PTP. The formal evaluation and certification process is the responsibility of the Marine Forces (MARFOR) Commander and delegated to the Special Operations Training Group (SOTG) resident within each Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF).<sup>18</sup> Neither the MAGTF Staff Training Program (MSTP) nor JFCOM is associated with the MEU PTP process or predeployment certification.

MEU PTP is not limited to maritime integration as the process also incorporates joint and interagency training. The PTP commonly includes training with other services as well as personnel from the Department of State (DOS), Country/Embassy Team and Disaster Assistance personnel, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Special Operations Forces (SOF), and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs). This interagency and joint training is included in all Situational Training Exercises (STXs), Training in an Urban Environment Exercise (TRUEX), MEU

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<sup>17</sup> U.S. Marine Corps, *MEU-SOC Predeployment Training Program*, 5.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, 14.

Exercise (MEUEX), and the certification Fleet Exercise/Special Operations Capable Exercise (FLEETEX/SOCEX).<sup>19</sup>

Staff training is a critical and integrated component of the collective training previously described. Prior to commencing the PTP, requirements dictate that certain members of the MEU attend specific courses.<sup>20</sup> At least one individual from the Command Element's intelligence section must be a graduate of the Intelligence Collection Manager's Course (ICMC)<sup>21</sup> and the Intelligence Analysis System Management Course (IAS).<sup>22</sup> Both of these courses are joint courses. The Command Element of the MEU is also required to have at least one officer graduate from each of the following courses:<sup>23</sup>

- Joint Psychological Operations Course at the United States Air Force Special Operations School (USAFSOS) at Hurlburt Field, Florida.
- Joint Command, Control, and Information Operations School (JC2IOS) at the Joint Forces Staff College, Norfolk, Virginia.
- Civil Affairs Course at the United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, Fort Bragg, North Carolina.

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<sup>19</sup> Ibid., 4.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid., 10.

<sup>21</sup> ICMC is a 21 day course taught at the Joint Military Intelligence Training Center in Washington, D.C.

<sup>22</sup> IAS is a 21 day course taught at the Navy/Marine Corps Intelligence Training Center in Washington, D.C.

<sup>23</sup> U.S. Marine Corps, *MEU-SOC Predeployment Training Program*, 10.



Additionally, the staff must possess expertise in Joint Operations Planning and Execution System (JOPES), Global Command and Control System (GCCS), and MAGTF Logistics Automated Information System.<sup>24</sup>

Initial training efforts during the MEU PTP focus on enhancing staff crisis response planning and decision-making capability. The Rapid Response Planning Process (R2P2) is introduced and exercised throughout the entire MEU PTP.<sup>25</sup> The PHIBRON and MEU staffs develop a cohesive capability to conduct R2P2 through simulated warning orders and crisis action team (CAT) drills. Initial training events are merely staff exercises while subsequent MEU PTP events culminate with actual live force execution. Each event continues to build capacity and proficiency in MEU crisis response.

Once the PTP commences, the MEU staff receives training through staff training exercises (STX). The Expeditionary Warfare Training Groups (EWTG) or SOTGs located within each MEF plan all required training events. The STXs are challenging and incrementally more difficult as the MEU PTP progresses.<sup>26</sup> Besides these STXs, the MEU staff completes a Crisis Interaction Requirements Exercise (CIREX) at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. The CIREX is a discussion-based training event built around a crisis scenario tailored to each MEU. It aims to enhance the Command Element staff's understanding of, and interoperability with, Joint Special Operations Task Forces and

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<sup>24</sup> Ibid., Enclosure 2, 1.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid., 3.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid., 7.

Joint Special Operations Command Elements. Staff members from both the PHIBRON and MEU CE participate in the CIREX. Conducting the CIREX at Fort Bragg, North Carolina ensures the maximum exposure of the PHIBRON/MEU personnel to their SOF counterparts.<sup>27</sup>

Subsequent MEU PTP events include Joint Task Force (JTF) and Fleet operations, requiring the MEU staff to interact and plan repeatedly with both the PHIBRON and Carrier Battle Group staffs. These events contribute significantly to the MEU's ability to participate successfully in JTF operations once deployed.<sup>28</sup> Additional exercises are conducted between the PHIBRON's Naval Special Warfare Detachment and the MEU. This training refines the staff's ability to plan rapidly and execute both traditional amphibious and special operations missions. This parallel training is essential to develop and maximize the inherent combat power of the PHIBRON/MEU.

During the MEU PTP, the staff participates in an operations and intelligence seminar coordinated by the Coalition and Special Warfare Center in Quantico, Virginia. This seminar provides Special Access Program read-ins for commanders and an overview of intelligence issues focused on the anticipated theater of operations. The seminar also addresses Command, Control, Communications, Coordination, Intelligence and Information architecture afloat, the joint intelligence architecture, interface ashore with

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<sup>27</sup> Ibid., 10.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid., 4.

shipboard systems, collection capabilities, and management of collection assets.<sup>29</sup> It is critical to note that while this seminar touches on joint matters, only service agencies and organizations plan and execute the seminar.

Prior to deployment, select members of the PHIBRON and MEU travel to Washington, D.C. and participate in an area commanders' briefing. During this period, the MEU staff receives briefings from senior Department of State, Department of Defense, Joint Staff, Headquarters Marine Corps, and Central Intelligence Agency personnel. Conducting these briefings within the Washington D.C. area ensures the highest level of participation by the organizations and external agencies involved. Other agencies or Unified Combatant Commander representatives are added at the request of the PHIBRON and MEU commanders.<sup>30</sup>

As described above, the collective training process for the MEU contains a standardized set of joint enhancements and exposure. The methodology for the MEU PTP has been refined through many years of experience and results in a unit prepared for its unique mission set. Each MEU provides the national authorities and Combatant Commanders a certified, operationally flexible, sea-based forward presence, highly capable in its role as the joint theater reserve.<sup>31</sup> The MEU PTP is a highly focused set of

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<sup>29</sup> Ibid.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid., 11.

<sup>31</sup> Chris P. Niedziocha, "The MEU," *Marine Corps Gazette*, January 2010, 34.

training activities designed to prepare the unit and associated naval enablers for deployment.

Although current MEU(SOC) preparations are thorough, joint enhancements could be added to increase the lethality and capability of deploying forces. A more deliberate exposure to higher JTF command headquarters would enhance the joint capability of the MEU. Currently, this exposure is absent from the PTP. At the lower end of the scale of exposure, this could take place as a staff orientation. For a more enhanced exposure, one of the scheduled MEU exercises could fall under the actual or simulated command and control of an actual JTF. Under most operational employment options, the deployed MEU will fall under the command of Combatant Command or a JTF. By exposing the MEU to such levels of command prior to deployment, both the MEU and the JTF would benefit.

Another potential training opportunity absent from the PTP is an exposure to real-world enablers prior to deployment execution. These enablers could include Combined Air Operations Centers, Joint Special Operations Task Forces, or Joint Intelligence and Operations Centers. By exposing MEUs to these enablers during workup training, both the supported and the supporting assets would benefit. Additionally, interoperability shortfalls and concepts for employment and integration could be refined prior to departure. Lastly, if those enablers were based in the planned deployment Area of Responsibility, intelligence sharing could enhance the situational awareness of the unit prior to deployment.

An additional shortfall of the current MEU PTP relates to the lack of association with MSTP and JFCOM with the certification process as both organizations represent significant resources and the capability to enhance operational readiness through joint training. Additionally, both organizations provide a standard set of certification skills that verify joint capabilities. MSTP provides “training in MAGTF warfighting skills, within the context of a joint and combined environment, in order to improve the warfighting skills of senior commanders and their staff.”<sup>32</sup> Currently, MSTP focuses training at the MEF/MEB level and does not participate in the MEU PTP. MSTP could enhance the PTP significantly and prepare the MEU more fully for joint operations.

JFCOM, specifically the Joint Warfighting Center (JWC) “provides highly realistic training with a joint context, revises the content and execution of training through adoption of lessons learned and best practices, and develops advanced technologies in conjunction with operational exercises.”<sup>33</sup> These JFCOM personnel are focused on expert functional area support in the development and management of the joint training programs including design, development, execution, and evaluation of joint training events, integration of interagency capabilities in preparation for integrated operations and the capture, analysis, and implementation of lessons learned.<sup>34</sup> Leveraging

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<sup>32</sup> U.S. Marine Corps, *MSTP*, 1.

<sup>33</sup> U.S. Joint Forces Command, USJFCOM: USJFCOM as Joint Trainer, <http://www.jfcom.mil/about/trainer.html> (accessed 20 March 2010).

<sup>34</sup> CJCS, *Joint Training Manual*, G-5.

the capabilities of JFCOM would significantly enhance the effectiveness of the MEU PTP and the joint capabilities of deploying MEUs.

As described above, the collective and staff training process for the MEU is standardized and thorough, resulting in a MAGTF prepared for operational employment as the joint theater reserve.<sup>35</sup> While complete, improvement of the MEU PTP is possible through the inclusion of joint enhancements and exposure. These activities would produce MAGTFs with greater operational capabilities.

**MAGTF Joint Training: MEB and MEF**

The Marine Corps does not conduct dedicated collective training for MEB or MEF sized units. The inherent combat capability of a MEB or MEF rests collectively on the training efforts of its subordinate units. This situation has not always existed in the service. Prior to 2003, the Marine Corps conducted ten Combined Arms Exercise (CAX) events at the MAGTF Training Center per fiscal year.<sup>36</sup> These events trained a MEB-sized MAGTF, facilitating force deployment, planning, and execution across all essential warfighting capabilities for the exercise force. Training goals, while unique to each individual CAX, consisted of the deployment of tactical forces; planning, directing, and executing intelligence operations, fires (lethal and nonlethal), nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) operations, aviation operations; air and ground maneuver; and

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<sup>35</sup> Niedziocha, "The MEU," 34.

<sup>36</sup> U.S. Marine Corps, *Marine Corps Combined Arms Exercise Program, MCO 3500.11E* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Marine Corps, 2004), 3.

sustainment operations in an expeditionary environment.<sup>37</sup> Further, each participating MAGTF exercised command and control (C2) practicing integration and synchronization of all four MAGTF elements in a combined arms battle space. Execution of the final CAX took place in the fall of 2002 prior to the commencement of OIF.

Since that time, predeployment training events have replaced routine large-scale MEB and MEF training. Related to this, the singular focus and deployment rate of many units have eroded the skills needed for the conduct of combined arms maneuver, mountain warfare, and amphibious operations. The Commandant has expressed concern over the lack of this collective training in his recently released Marine Corps Service Campaign Plan (MCSCP) stating “this challenge is particularly acute at the MEB and MEF level, where opportunities to maintain our historically high levels of proficiency in these operations have been reduced.”<sup>38</sup> In reaction to this deficiency, the service has outlined intermediate objectives over the next decade to reinstitute training designed to recover these capabilities. During phase one of the MCSCP, each MEF has been tasked to focus on regaining core competency at the MEB level through the development and execution of training and exercise programs focused on amphibious and joint/multinational operations.<sup>39</sup> However, current operational tempo precludes the conduct of collective training at this level for the Marine Corps. The SPMAGTF-A

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<sup>37</sup> Ibid., 2.

<sup>38</sup> U.S. Marine Corps, *United States Marine Corps Service Campaign 2009-2015* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Marine Corps, 2009), 3.

<sup>39</sup> William Beydler and Edward Novack, “The Marine Corps Service Campaign Plan,” *Marine Corps Gazette*, February 2010, 74.

scenario described at the beginning of the paper is a manifestation of this training gap. While the Marine Corps does not currently conduct collective training for MEB or MEF sized units, the MEF staff trains on a recurring basis facilitated through MSTP to maintain the operational joint readiness of MEB- and MEF-sized MAGTFs.

MEB and MEF staff training consists of a comprehensive six-part package normally provided to each MEF staff every 24 months. This training package consists of a Command, Control, Communication, and Computers Mobile Training Team, a Warfighting Seminar, a Planning Practical Application, an Economics and Governance Conference, a Command Post Exercise (CPX), and an After Action Review (AAR).<sup>40</sup> The intent of the program is to provide the MEF staff training in the warfighting capabilities of a MAGTF within the context of a joint and combined environment. MSTP interfaces with JFCOM in order to provide a robust joint context to each training package. Specific goals for the MSTP training normally include staff Operational Plan development, MEB Forcible Entry and Amphibious Landing staff training, and Combatant Commander directed JTF certification exercises.<sup>41</sup>

As described above, the staff training process for both MEB and MEF units contains a standardized set of joint enhancement simulations and exposures. MSTP derives training goals and objectives for each exercise from the Marine Corps Task List

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<sup>40</sup> U.S. Marine Corps, *MSTP*, 3.

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*, 9.



for tasks required of a MEB Command Element.<sup>42</sup> Goals and objectives focus the exercise design providing primary direction for scenario development, operational planning team planning, and CPXs, as well as provide a basis for the AAR. These goals and objectives also provide inputs to the Expeditionary Force Development System for the enhancement of future MAGTFs.<sup>43</sup> Each training process is uniquely designed by MSTP and guided by *MCO 1500.53A, The MAGTF Staff Training Program Order*. Typical joint enhancements include exposure to applicable theater C2 systems, fire support planning and procedures, logistics and medical support, special operations force integration, and counter improvised explosive device technologies.<sup>44</sup>

The methodology used by MSTP has been refined through many years of experience and results in a staff prepared for its unique mission set. Each MEB/MEF provides the national authorities and Combatant Commanders a staff prepared for the variety and complexity of warfighting tasks for further assignment in support of a joint force commander's campaign. The MSTP exercise program provides professional training and education, accompanied by rigorous staff exercises, in order to maximize the proficiency and effectiveness of the principal leadership of the MAGTF. This MAGTF must be able to integrate quickly with, and fight under, the joint force. While very

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<sup>42</sup> Director, Marine Corps Air-Ground Task Force Staff Training Program, *Exercise Agreement for MEB-A 10 MRX*, August 27, 2009, 1-1.

<sup>43</sup> The EFDS is governed by the *Marine Corps Expeditionary Force Development System, MCO 3900.15B* and is used to develop future warfighting capabilities to meet national security objectives. This is a service-specific system that guides the identification, development, and integration of warfighting and associated support and infrastructure capabilities for the MAGTF.

<sup>44</sup> Director, MSTP, *Exercise Agreement for MEB-A 10 MRX*, 2-C-1.

thorough, exploitable gaps exist within the MSTP training continuum that limit its capability to further enhancing staff training with joint enablers.

Similar to the MEU PTP, a deliberate exposure to higher JTF or Combatant Command headquarters during the MRX would enhance the joint awareness and capability of the MEB/MEF staff. Currently, this exposure is absent from the training syllabus. By exposing the MEB/MEF staff to these organizations prior to deployment, both the MAGTF and the JTF/Combatant Command would benefit.

Another potential training opportunity absent from the MSTP program is simulating the execution of a real world contingency plans that the MAGTF is currently allocated towards. Exposure to these plans, with planning representatives from the related members of the Joint Planning and Execution Community would provide an opportunity to gain staff familiarity with the plans as well as execute the fourth planning function of the Joint Operations Planning Process, keeping the plan in a “living state.”<sup>45</sup>

While MSTP interacts regularly with JFCOM, an additional shortfall of current MEB/MEF staff training relates to the training design and execution process. JFCOM’s JWFC is not associated with the process. Additionally, JFCOM can support operational requirements with the Joint Warfare Analysis Center, Joint Personal Recovery Agency, Joint Center for Operational Analysis, and the Joint Fires Integration & Interoperability Team. Trainers from both JWFC and the Special Operations Command can provide

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<sup>45</sup> Joint Forces Staff College, *The Joint Advanced Warfighting School Operational Art and Campaigning Primer*, AY 09-10, (Norfolk, Virginia: Joint Forces Staff College, 2009), 425.

tailored training assistance during MRX execution.<sup>46</sup> Through leveraging the efforts of JFCOM, the MSTP program would be significantly enhanced.

As described above, the Marine Corps does not conduct dedicated collective training for MEB or MEF sized units. Currently, the inherent combat capability of a MEB or MEF rests collectively on the training efforts of the subordinate units, staff training events, and MRXs. This represents a significant joint context shortfall and the service has outlined intermediate objectives over the next decade to reinstitute training designed to recover these capabilities. The staff training process for the MEB and MEF, while standardized and thorough, could be enhanced to result in a MAGTF with greater operational capability.

### **Implications**

Despite exploitable gaps in current MAGTF training, the Marine Corps will continue to receive tasking to support global operational requirements. As a result, there are implications to these joint context shortfalls. Until the Marine Corps regains MEB and MEF core competencies, individual units will require more time to establish full operational capability upon the initial establishment of a joint force. This was clearly evidenced in the SPMAGTF-A example listed in the introduction. Additionally, until the Marine Corps regains collective joint training at the MEB and MEF level, the inherent combat capability of those units rests collectively on the training efforts of individual units. Despite that, predeployment training standards have improved since the loss of the

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<sup>46</sup> Gary Luck and Mike Findlay, *Joint Operations Insights and Best Practices 2nd Edition*, (Suffolk, Virginia: JWFC, Joint Forces Command, Joint Training Division, July 2008), 25.

CAX training event, unit training remains very service focused, reinforcing the natural tendency of individuals to rely on what is known best or more fully understood when a problem arises. Until the Marine Corps reestablishes a more rigorous joint training capability for its largest units, this tendency will prevail. Unless, of course, service doctrine provides a solution to bridge the intermediate gap created by current training and education deficits.

## CHAPTER IV: DOCTRINE

Military doctrine establishes the guidance on how best to employ national military power to achieve strategic ends. It represents an accumulation of knowledge, reflecting combat and training experiences, experimentation, and theory. Doctrine captures the fundamental principles that guide the employment of military forces in unified action toward a common objective.<sup>1</sup> Furthermore, it provides the foundation for education, training, and equipping of joint and service forces, as well as for the execution of joint operations.

The challenge facing the Marine Corps is to develop effective doctrine that meets both service requirements and those requirements imposed by the joint force, government agencies and multinational organizations. This demands congruency between service doctrine and joint doctrine. Doctrine must also be responsive to changes demanded by today's rapidly changing environment. The future environment requires innovative adjustments to our existing doctrine and doctrine development processes.<sup>2</sup> However, these efforts represent significant departures from past practices of doctrine development and represent a transformation in the way the Marine Corps must think about doctrine.

Additionally, to enhance joint capabilities, the services should jointly define and use key operational terms. This means that military terminology should be standardized,

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<sup>1</sup> Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Doctrine Development System, CJCSI, 5120.02A*, (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2007), A-1.

<sup>2</sup> Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations Version 3.0, CCJO 3.0*, (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, January 15, 2009), 17.

precise, and widely understood. This common ground facilitates concise, clear mission statements and succinct communication of the commander's intent.

### **Definition of a Joint Doctrinal Context**

In the case of doctrine, sufficient joint context exists when there is a condition of congruency within the hierarchy of doctrinal publications. Congruent doctrine provides a clear linkage from the tactical to the operational and ultimately the strategic level of war. An interoperable service doctrine explains force employment at the operational level of war as part of a joint or combined force.

Doctrine lacking interoperability is also often incomplete and contradictory. It can represent a compromise between competing views within a service and among the services. A weakness in the U.S. joint force's doctrine development process has been the requirement to build consensus among the services by removing portions challenged by any service. As a result, the final product reflects the lowest common denominator, resulting in "imprecise, confusing, or contradictory concepts."<sup>3</sup>

*At field level, jointness still has a way to go. Doctrinal differences between the services still exist. As in the past they are frequently papered over with ambiguous language in joint agreements, leaving commanders in the field to interpret differences on a case-by-case basis.*<sup>4</sup>

A service doctrine commits the entire service to the same rules, principles, and standards for the conduct of war. It describes how a particular service should plan, prepare, and

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<sup>3</sup> Thomas Durell Young and Douglas C. Lovelace Jr, "Joint Doctrine Development: Overcoming a Legacy," *Joint Force Quarterly*, Winter 1996-1997, 95.

<sup>4</sup> Trainor, "Jointness, Service Culture, and the Gulf War," 74.

execute major operations, independently and in cooperation with other services or multinational forces.<sup>5</sup> A service doctrine establishes a framework for the tactical doctrine of individual combat arms or branches, platforms, and sensors. It provides direction for the future capabilities of the service. Service doctrine also provides a baseline for individual and unit training and guides the professional education of officers, enlisted and civilian personnel. Sound service doctrine should explain the employment of service forces across the spectrum of warfare and in any physical environment.

### **Joint Doctrine Requirements**

Joint Doctrine requirements are promulgated from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff through *The Joint Doctrine Development System, CJCSI 5120.02A*.<sup>6</sup> Service and joint doctrine are the principal means of promoting a common outlook on the nature and character of warfare and all its aspects. The need for cooperation among the services is emphasized during doctrine development. Preservation of individual service identity is also critical. Doctrine should be descriptive, not prescriptive, allowing the greatest degree of flexibility in application, facilitating innovative approaches to mission accomplishment.

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<sup>5</sup> Barry P. Messina, *Development of U.S. Joint and Amphibious Doctrine, 1898–1945*, (Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analysis, September 1994), 30–31.

<sup>6</sup> CJCS, *Joint Doctrine Development System*, A-1.

## **USMC Service Doctrine**

The Marine Corps develops doctrine at the Marine Corps Combat Development Command in Quantico, Virginia. Sound service and joint doctrine are critically important for the training of future operational commanders.

Previously described shortfalls indicate that formal Marine Corps doctrine may lack a joint context. However, following a review of current service doctrine and the process used to develop it, there is significant indication that no shortfall exists between tactical level service publications and joint doctrine.<sup>7</sup> Since doctrine forms the foundation for education and training and there were shortfalls identified earlier in the paper, this creates a disconnect within the logic of the original thesis. How is it that doctrine can be correct, but the education and training have deficiencies? An update from the Joint Staff J-7 revealed the likely source of inconsistency within our current military doctrine and policy structure.

## **Force Development Policy and Doctrine**

Currently *Joint Publication 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*, provides the fundamental principles and overarching guidance for the employment of joint forces. It links joint doctrine to national strategy and establishes links between doctrine and policy. It is the “capstone joint doctrine publication”<sup>8</sup> written to assist individual services as components of a joint team to operate together. It focuses on

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<sup>7</sup> The author conducted a detailed analysis and comparison of service and joint doctrine, finding no significant discrepancies or inconsistencies between the two.

<sup>8</sup> Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, Joint Publication 1* (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 20 March 2009), i.



“forming, training, exercising, and employing joint forces”<sup>9</sup> at all possible levels and through a wide range of military operations. One key to realizing the full potential of a joint force that is not currently contained in this publication is how we develop the joint force.<sup>10</sup> As stated recently in a *Joint Force Quarterly* article:

*While the United States has been developing the joint force, the many and diverse parts of this process are not yet holistically and cohesively articulated, the result being a myriad of individual policies and communities in isolation. JP 1 should provide the strategic framework that aligns the Chairman’s long-term vision with the development of the joint forces.*<sup>11</sup>

While the initial theory was that Marine Corps service doctrine might lack congruity with joint doctrine creating gaps in joint training, it appears that the primary doctrinal shortfall may be the lack of guidance and standardization for force development as established in the capstone joint publication. Current efforts are underway to develop a new chapter for JP 1, which will answer two fundamental questions in this regard: first, what is joint force development and second, what is the process used to develop the force. Although it will not be all-inclusive, critical components of this revised joint doctrine will address concept development, doctrine, education, training, and exercises.

Consistent with this endeavor, the Joint Staff has proposed a draft definition of the joint force development process:

*A deliberate, iterative, and continuous process of planning and developing the current and future joint force through advancement of*

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<sup>9</sup> CJCS, *Joint Publication 1*, ii.

<sup>10</sup> Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, J7 Joint Education and Doctrine Division, “Joint Doctrine Update,” *Joint Force Quarterly*, 2<sup>nd</sup> quarter 2010, 134.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid.

*transformational joint concepts which are refined into relevant doctrine, promulgated through career long education and training, validated through a robust exercise program, resulting in decisive, adaptable war plans.*<sup>12</sup>

Many of the gaps and implications listed in previous chapters may be addressed through this refinement of capstone joint doctrine.

The lack of a defined and standardized force development process adversely affects jointness because each service conducts force development on its own terms. Improved joint doctrine for force development would provide a common method from which to plan and operate. It would fundamentally reshape the way services think about and train for joint warfare. Such joint force development doctrine should reflect the distillation of the insights and wisdom gained from our collective experience. It should also incorporate basic principles to guide the education and training of joint future forces.

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<sup>12</sup> Ibid.

## CONCLUSION

Success in a joint environment and effective joint force integration requires a greater understanding of the doctrine-based attributes of each service under a common, comprehensive joint doctrine supported by effective joint training and education.<sup>1</sup> As stated by General Conway in the 2009 version of USMC Concepts & Programs:

*A clearly changing characteristic of the modern battle space is the shift from a primarily military focus to one that achieves a greater degree of operational integration of all instruments of national power. Accordingly, we will extend our combined-arms approach and add a “combined-actions” orientation. We will integrate interagency capabilities into our training, education, campaign planning and operations while also improving our own capabilities to lead joint task forces.*<sup>2</sup>

The Marine Corps has an enviable reputation for innovation and adaptation, and maintains the highest standards of excellence in the art of warfare. The service has a proven method of developing exceptional individuals and units through a blend of training, experience, and education. Historically, this preparation has focused on service-specific requirements without the realistic demands of a joint context. In future operational contexts, the Marine Corps will continue to join or lead joint forces. Enhancing the Marine Corps’ Title X responsibilities to include realistic joint demands will significantly enhance the combat capability of future Marine Corps forces.

Reviewing the experiences of SPMAGTF-A, imagine a force consisting of Marines thoroughly educated in a PME system designed to inculcate joint appreciation across the force. Each of the Marines are taught about the capabilities of all relevant

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<sup>1</sup> CJCS, *CCJO* 3.0, 14.

<sup>2</sup> U.S. Marine Corps, *United States Marine Corps Concepts and Programs* 2009, 20.

assets within the joint force and coalition partners in a collaborative learning environment thoroughly infused with peers from other services. During the months preceding the deployment, picture the units of SPMAGTF-A training together at 29 Palms or Fort Irwin utilizing both operationally complex scenarios and live joint enabling assets. All of their equipment will have been tested and validated for joint interoperability, enabling rapid and decisive communication with higher headquarters, providing accurate blue force tracking capabilities and a common operating picture across the entire joint operational area. Guiding these Marines is a set of doctrinal publications and standards that facilitate the rapid and effective inclusion of both joint and coalition forces during every operational scenario on the battlefield. Imagine the 30-man force, ambushed by 250 insurgents receiving immediate close air support from coalition aircraft and supporting fires from Army High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS). Picture the 1<sup>st</sup> Platoon of CLB-3's Motor Transportation Company spotting pockets of insurgents along their route utilizing persistent ISR assets provided by the Air Force, engaging those enemy forces with effective CAS prior to receiving fire along their route. While this imaginary scenario may seem beyond our current capability, let's compare it to an actual experience encountered later in their deployment by SPMAGTF-A.

In April, 2009, after having been in country for five months, SPMAGTF-A conducted a major combat operation in the Helmand Province city of Now Zad. Lima Company, 3d Battalion, 8<sup>th</sup> Marines were supported during the operation by CLB-3 engineers, rocket artillery provided by the Army tactical missile system and HIMARS. Various aircraft provided close air support including Navy F/A-18 Hornets, Air Force B-

1B Lancers and Marine AH-1W Cobras. Marines used leaflet drops and radio broadcasts in the area to warn the population in nearby villages of danger in the area. This joint operation was a tremendous success on all levels. Enemy forces were destroyed, no civilian casualties took place, and the Marines were able to reintroduce Afghan-led governance into the area upon completion of the battle.<sup>3</sup> This was great example of success and effectiveness achieved through full joint integration.

Both present and future planners must recognize the value of enhancing service education, training, equipment and doctrine with joint context. Jointness is a characteristic to be exploited, not suppressed.<sup>4</sup> This concluding vignette exemplifies Marines employed as an effective joint force and it contrasts significantly with the SPMAGTF-A experience of their initial days in Afghanistan. However, SPMAGTF-A's earlier experiences and failures were a high price to pay for this jointness that might have been achieved through enhanced joint doctrine, and the improved education and training that would flow from it.

This paper has identified instances across the education, training and doctrinal spectrum where the future operating environment demands cultural shifts and further transformation. The Marine Corps is a very adaptive organization. In spite of these shortfalls, it has managed to be highly successful throughout history. Greater joint

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
<sup>3</sup> Renaldo R. Keene, "The War on Terror." *Leatherneck Magazine*, June 2009, 12.

<sup>4</sup> Trainor, "Jointness, Service Culture, and the Gulf War," 74.

enhancements will allow the Marine Corps and the joint force as a whole to become an even more effective fighting force.

While focused specifically on the United States Marine Corps, these issues can and should be considered by other services in an effort to determine relevant shortfalls. The days of single-service operations are behind us, and the future joint environment dictates that all components must contribute in order to achieve a success greater than the efforts of individual parts. Awareness of jointness shortfalls is the first step in the achievement of a more effective and successful fighting force. The continued security of our nation depends upon the collective effort of us all.

## Appendix A: Officer PME Education Continuum<sup>1</sup>

GRADE	CADET/MSHIPMAN	O-1/O-2/O-3	O-4	O-5/O-6	O-7/O-8/O-9
EDUCATION LEVEL	PRECOMMISSIONING	PRIMARY	INTERMEDIATE	SENIOR	GENERAL/FLAG
EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND COURSES	Service Academies  ROTC  OCS/JOTS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>Branch, Warfare or Staff Specialty Schools</li><li>Primary-Level PME Courses</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>Air Command and Staff College</li><li>Army Command and General Staff School</li><li>College of Naval Command and Staff</li><li>Marine Corps Command and Staff College</li><li>JFSC, Joint and Combined Warfighting School</li><li>JFSC, Joint Advanced Warfighting School<sup>1</sup></li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>Air War College</li><li>Army War College</li><li>College of Naval Warfare</li><li>Marine Corps War College</li><li>Industrial College of the Armed Forces<sup>1</sup></li><li>National War College<sup>1</sup></li><li>JFSC, Joint and Combined Warfighting School</li><li>JFSC, Joint Advanced Warfighting School<sup>1</sup></li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>CAPSTONE</li><li>Joint Functional Component Commander Courses</li><li>Joint Flag Officer Warfighting Course</li><li>PINNACLE</li></ul>
LEVELS OF WAR EMPHASIZED	Conceptual Awareness of all Levels				
FOCUS OF MILITARY EDUCATION	Introduction to Services Missions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>Assigned Branch, Warfare or Staff Specialty</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>Warfighting within the context of Operational Art</li><li>Intro to theater strategy and plans, national military strategy and national security strategy</li><li>Develop analytical capabilities and creative thought</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>Service Schools: strategic leadership, national military strategy and theater strategy</li><li>NWC: national security strategy</li><li>ICAF: national security strategy with emphasis on the resource components</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>Joint matters and national security</li><li>Interagency process</li><li>Multinational operations</li></ul>
JOINT EMPHASIS	<u>Joint Introduction</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>National Military Capabilities and Organization</li><li>Foundation of Joint Warfare</li></ul>	<u>Joint Awareness</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>Joint Warfare Fundamentals</li><li>Joint Campaigning</li></ul>	<u>JPME Phase I</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>National military strategy</li><li>National military capabilities command structure and strategic guidance</li><li>Joint doctrine and concepts</li><li>Joint and multinational forces at the operational level of war</li><li>Joint planning and execution processes</li><li>Information operations, C2 and battlespace awareness</li><li>Joint force and joint requirements development</li></ul>	<u>JPME Phase I</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>National security strategy</li><li>National planning systems and processes</li><li>National and theater military strategy, campaigning and organization</li><li>Joint doctrine, force and requirements development</li><li>Information operations, C2 and battlespace awareness</li><li>Joint strategic leader development</li></ul>	<u>JPME Phase II</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>National security strategy</li><li>National military strategy and organization</li><li>Joint warfare, theater strategy and campaigning</li><li>National and joint planning systems and processes</li><li>Integration of Joint, IA and multinational capabilities</li><li>Information ops, C2 and battlespace awareness</li><li>Joint force and joint requirements development</li><li>Joint strategic leader development</li></ul>
			<u>AJPME and JPME Phase II</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>National strategic security systems and guidance and command structures</li><li>Theater strategy and campaigning</li><li>Integration of Joint interagency (IA) and multinational capabilities</li><li>Information operations</li><li>Joint planning systems</li></ul>		<u>CAPSTONE</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>National security strategy</li><li>Joint operational art</li><li><u>Joint Functional Component Commander Courses &amp; JFOWC</u></li><li>National security strategy</li><li>National planning systems and organization</li><li>National military strategy &amp; organization</li><li>Theater strategy, campaigning and military operations in Joint, interagency, and multinational environment</li><li>Information operations</li><li>Strategic leader development</li></ul> <u>PINNACLE</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>Joint/Combined force development</li><li>Building &amp; commanding the joint combined force</li><li>The JFC and the IA, NCA, NMS and the Congress</li></ul>

<sup>1</sup> CJCS, *Officer Professional Military Education Policy*, p A-A-A-1.

## Appendix B: Enlisted PME Education Continuum<sup>1</sup>

ENLISTED MILITARY EDUCATION CONTINUUM					
GRADES	E-1 TO E-3	E-4 TO E-6	E-6/7	E-8 TO E-9	E-9
EDUCATION LEVEL	INTRODUCTORY	PRIMARY	INTERMEDIATE	SENIOR	EXECUTIVE
EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS COURSE AND OPPORTUNITIES	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Service Initial Entry Training</li> <li>-Basic Development Schools and Courses</li> <li>-Basic EJPME</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-PME Academies, Schools and Courses</li> <li>-Basic EJPME</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-PME Academies, Schools and Courses</li> <li>-Senior EJPME Course</li> <li>-Career EJPME</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-PME Academies, Schools, Courses, Seminars, Symposiums, and Conferences</li> <li>-Senior EJPME Course</li> <li>-Career EJPME</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Courses, Seminars, Symposiums, and Conferences</li> <li>-CSEL KEYSTONE</li> </ul>
LEVELS OF WAR EMPHASIZED	<div style="text-align: center;"> <p>TACTICAL</p> <p>OPERATIONAL</p> <p>STRATEGIC</p> </div>				
FOCUS OF MILITARY EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Establish Tactical Warfighting Skills</li> <li>-Service-Specific Competencies</li> <li>-Followership and Fundamentals of Leadership</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Expand Tactical Warfighting Skills</li> <li>-Leadership and Management Skills in Service and MOS</li> <li>-Small Team/Unit Leadership</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Advance Tactical Warfighting Skills</li> <li>-Introduce Operational Level of War</li> <li>-Unit/Organizational Leadership</li> <li>-Advanced Leadership and Management Skills in Service and MOS</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Expand Operational Level of Warfighting</li> <li>-Introduction to Interagency and Multinational Operations</li> <li>-Organizational &amp; Command SEL</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Expand Interagency and Multinational Operations</li> <li>-Introduction to Strategic Theater Level of Warfighting</li> <li>-CSEL</li> </ul>
JOINT EMPHASIS AREAS	<p style="text-align: center;"><u>Basic EJPME</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-National Military Capabilities</li> <li>-Armed Forces Overview</li> </ul>		<p style="text-align: center;"><u>Senior EJPME Course</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-National Military Capabilities and Organization</li> <li>-Armed Forces Overview</li> <li>-Foundations of Joint Operations</li> <li>-National Strategic Overview</li> </ul> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>Career EJPME</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-National Military Capabilities and Organization</li> <li>-Armed Forces Overview</li> <li>-Foundations of Joint Operations</li> <li>-National Strategic Overview</li> </ul>	<p style="text-align: center;"><u>Senior EJPME</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-National Military Capabilities and Organization</li> <li>-Joint Doctrine</li> <li>-Service, Joint, Interagency, and Multinational Capabilities</li> <li>-Defense Acquisition and Resourcing</li> </ul> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>CSEL KEYSTONE Course</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-National Military Capabilities and Organization</li> <li>-Joint Doctrine</li> <li>-Service, Joint, Interagency, and Multinational Capabilities</li> <li>-Defense Acquisition and Resourcing</li> </ul>	

<sup>1</sup> CJCS, *Enlisted Professional Military Education Policy*, p A-A-A-1.



## Appendix C: Enlisted Introductory and Primary PME Summary

The Marine Corps maintains no resident enlisted introductory level PME course for Privates. These Marines are required to complete the distance-learning module “Leading Marines” prior to being eligible for promotion to Lance Corporal.<sup>1</sup> It consists of a self-paced, individual effort workbook and exam administered by the Marine Corps Institute. 15 hours of study time is required.<sup>2</sup> Specific joint emphasis areas in this course include a review of national military capabilities and an overview of other service capabilities.

The Marine Corps maintains very few resident introductory-level PME courses for Lance Corporals. These Marines are required to complete a three-week resident “Corporal’s Course,” presented at the Marine Corps Staff Academies in Quantico, Camp Lejeune, 29 Palms, and Hawaii.<sup>3</sup> Beginning in 2007, the Marine Corps transitioned from formal resident courses to MCU-certified unit-level resident PME courses. These courses are formally entitled Command Sponsored Corporals Courses (CSCC) and provide the “skills required to lead Marines as a noncommissioned officer.”<sup>4</sup> Building upon the joint emphasis areas found in initial education, the students are further exposed to national military capabilities and sister service capabilities.

The Marine Corps maintains six service-sponsored resident enlisted primary level PME courses. Each course is nearly two months in length and conducted at Marine Corps Staff Academies. 2,960 quotas are available during fiscal year 2010 with 2,887 quotas dedicated to Marines, 35 quotas to other U. S. service members, and 38 quotas to international students.<sup>5</sup> With a service-wide population of 64,830<sup>6</sup> Marines in the Corporal and Sergeant ranks, the majority (nearly 95 percent) are required to complete PME via a non-resident program. Non-resident primary level PME for Sergeants, the Sergeant’s Distance Education Program (SGTDEP), consists of a self-paced, seven part course with exams administered by the MCI.<sup>7</sup> The course requires 84 hours of study time.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> U.S. Marine Corps, *Cancellation of MCI0033 and the Distribution of the Leading Marines MCI*, MARADMIN 370/07, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Marine Corps, 2007), para 2.

<sup>2</sup> <https://www.mci.usmc.mil/StudentDashboard/courseListing.aspx> (accessed 15 Feb 10).

<sup>3</sup> U.S. Marine Corps, *FY2010 Class Dates and Quota Assignments for the Regional Staff Noncommissioned Officer Academies*, MARADMIN 477/09, Washington, D.C., 2009, para 5.

<sup>4</sup> U.S. Marine Corps, *Professional Military Education*, 2-8.

<sup>5</sup> U.S. Marine Corps, MARADMIN 477/09, para 3.

<sup>6</sup> U.S. Marine Corps, *United States Marine Corps Concepts and Programs 2009*, 260.

<sup>7</sup> Hawkins, “Enlisted PME,” 16.

<sup>8</sup> <https://www.mci.usmc.mil/StudentDashboard/courseListing.aspx> (accessed 10 Feb 10).

## Appendix D: Enlisted Intermediate PME Summary

Staff Sergeants are required to complete an eight-week resident “Career Course” period of instruction, either via distance-learning module or in a resident format. It consists of a self-paced, online course requiring 59.5 total study hours. It is divided into 5 parts with an exam administered by MCI at regional distance learning centers.<sup>1</sup> The Marine Corps maintains four service-sponsored resident enlisted intermediate level PME courses. Each course is nearly two months in length and conducted at Marine Corps Staff Academies in Quantico, VA; Camp Lejeune, NC; Camp Pendleton, CA; and Camp Butler, JA. 2,424 quotas are available during fiscal year 2010 dedicating 2,358 quotas to Marines, 24 quotas to other U. S. service members, and 42 quotas to international students.<sup>2</sup> With a service-wide population of 15,201<sup>3</sup> Marines with the rank of Staff Sergeant, the majority (nearly 84 percent) are required to complete PME via a non-resident program. Non-resident intermediate level PME for Staff Sergeants, the Staff NCO Career Distance Education Program (SNCOCDEP), focuses on providing skills needed for leadership at that rank and contain EPMEP-compliant topics dedicated to an understanding of the joint environment.<sup>4</sup>

Gunnery Sergeants are required to complete an eight-week resident “Advanced Course” period of instruction both via distance-learning module and in a resident format. The non-resident course builds on the SNCOCDEP curriculum with the specific purpose of developing the senior SNCO's ability to lead at the rank of Gunnery Sergeant. This advanced course contains all required EPMEP joint topics and requires 48 study hours divided into five parts. An end of course exam is administered by MCI at regional distance learning centers.<sup>5</sup>

The Marine Corps maintains four service-sponsored resident enlisted intermediate-level PME courses. Each course is nearly two months in length and conducted at Marine Corps Staff Academies. 1,780 quotas are available during fiscal year 2010 dedicating 1,740 quotas to Marines, 23 quotas to other U. S. service members, and 17 quotas to international students.<sup>6</sup> With a service-wide population of 8,234 Marines<sup>7</sup> with the rank of Gunnery Sergeant, the competition for attending these courses is high.

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<sup>1</sup> <https://www.mci.usmc.mil/StudentDashboard/courseListing.aspx> (accessed February 23, 2010).

<sup>2</sup> U.S. Marine Corps, *MARADMIN 477/09*, para 3.

<sup>3</sup> U.S. Marine Corps, *United States Marine Corps Concepts and Programs 2009*, p 260.

<sup>4</sup> U.S. Marine Corps, *Professional Military Education*, p 2-10.

<sup>5</sup> <https://www.mci.usmc.mil/StudentDashboard/courseListing.aspx> accessed on 23 Feb 10.

<sup>6</sup> U.S. Marine Corps, *MARADMIN 477/09*, para 3.

<sup>7</sup> U.S. Marine Corps, *United States Marine Corps Concepts and Programs 2009*, pg 260.

## Appendix E: Marine Corps Professional Reading Program Summary

In 1988, General A. M. Gray initiated the Marine Corps Professional reading program. The intent of the program, initially entitled the “Commandant’s Reading List,” was to provide a continuum of study for all Marine leaders.<sup>1</sup> General Gray identified six objectives that stand unchanged today.<sup>2</sup>

- 1) To impart a sense of Marine values and traits
- 2) To increase knowledge of our profession
- 3) To improve analytical and reasoning skills
- 4) To increase capacity of using printed media as a means of learning and communication
- 5) To increase knowledge of our Nation’s institutions and the principles upon which our country and way of life were founded
- 6) To increase knowledge of the World’s governments, culture, and geography

Each Commandant since 1988 has placed his personal stamp on the program, but many of the books have remained constant. In September of 2009, General Conway streamlined the current version to five titles and one capstone doctrinal publication per grade. The current list is smaller than previous versions facilitating a more realistic goal for busy Marines. The mandatory portion is limited to these titles constituting the central component of a larger professional reading program for Marines.<sup>3</sup>

As the Commandant’s arbiter, Marine Corps University (MCU) maintains the entire professional reading program through a web-based application. In addition to book lists, MCU posts individual discussion guides for each book. Supplemental book lists reside on the site organized into various categories including warfighting functions (combat arms, intelligence, logistics); world region/culture (Middle East, Asia, Africa); and military specialty (irregular warfare, leadership, biography).<sup>4</sup> A recent addition to the website are three civilian Marine reading lists, one augmenting the acculturation process, one targeting leadership and management, and one covering mentoring topics.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> U.S. Marine Corps, *Marine Corps Professional Reading Program*, ALMAR 007/05, para 2.

<sup>2</sup> Alfred M. Gray, *Commandant’s Reading List*, CMC MSG 111500ZJUL1989, para 3.

<sup>3</sup> U.S. Marine Corps, *Updates to Marine Corps Professional Reading List*, ALMAR 029/09, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Marine Corps, 2009), para 2.

<sup>4</sup> [http://www.mcu.usmc.mil/lejeune\\_leadership/pages/professionalpro.aspx](http://www.mcu.usmc.mil/lejeune_leadership/pages/professionalpro.aspx) (accessed 20 Feb 2010).

<sup>5</sup> Ibid.

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